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ABSTRACT 
 
The purpose of this study is to find out whether the surprises related to the European 
Central Bank’s decisions about the level of the key interest rate causes asymmetric reac-
tions among characteristic-classified stock portfolios. Hypotheses propose that the stock 
returns of small, indebted and unprofitable firms are unequal to the returns of inverse 
firms. Positive and negative surprises are investigated also separately taking possible 
nonlinearity into account which exposes whether monetary policy actions have circum-
stantial effects on stock prices. The evidence implicates the importance of credit chan-
nels in transmission mechanism. 
 
The sample data during 1999–2010 consists of the daily returns of stock portfolios con-
structed from the EURO STOXX index, the ECB’s monthly decisions about the level of 
the key interest rate, daily values of Euribor and Euribor swap rates for one week and 
one month maturity and overnight Eonia rate. The different market rates are used to 
measure the magnitude of surprise and to explain portfolio returns in regression analy-
sis. Seemingly unrelated regression estimation and the Wald test are applied to find hy-
pothetical difference in firm-level. 
 
The results imply, as opposed to prior studies, that the firm size is not important factor 
in this context in the euro area whereas financial standing and profitability are more 
remarkable. Small firms seem to gain relatively more from monetary policy than large 
firms and thus show reverse evidence against former understanding. The most indebted 
firms react to surprises but self-financing firms are immune to them. Profitability-
portfolios behave similarly with portfolios related to financial standing but more often 
average-profitable portfolios are statistically significant than the far portfolios. In gen-
eral, stocks seem to be more sensible to negative surprises than positive ones. Only triv-
ial signs of nonlinearity are observed.  
 
The ECB’s monetary policy decisions are forecasted quite faithfully in stock markets. 
Still, the sense of credit channel is noticeable in the euro area. The results indicate also 
problems to find indicator which measure validly and reliably monetary policy surpris-
es. 
KEYWORDS: Monetary policy surprises, firm characteristics, stock price reactions 
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1. INRODUCTION 
 
According to widely received theory and evidence, central banks’ monetary policy af-
fect to economy aggregates through certain transmissions or channels. That complex 
construction is commonly called within economy watchers as a transmission mecha-
nism. Stock prices are exposed to monetary policy effects in the transmission mecha-
nism through channels both immediate and indirect. Valuation theories based on the 
fundamental facts of firm imply that stock price is comprised mainly of discounted fu-
ture cash flows. Seeing that monetary policy indicates central bank’s opinions about 
upcoming economic trends in future, it has immediate influence to stock prices. Intui-
tively reviewed, the shares of those economic trends can be direct to isolated firms 
which are reflected in their stock prices. That is proved also empirically by Bernanke 
and Kuttner (2005), whose result is that the influence is mainly a consequence of 
changes in expected cash flows and dividends, while changes in expected interest rates, 
which define the discount rates, are inconclusive. The indirect influences which can be 
specified through channels are for example firm’s changed borrowing limitations or 
changes in investors’ allocation preferences.  
 
The role of common stocks in the transmission mechanism has kept track in academic 
discussion over decades. Studies related on the implications of monetary policy have 
likely been done most of all in the district of interest rate markets. In case of stock mar-
kets, absolute price changes and volatility alike have been under examination. The sub-
ject matter has been approached in addition to settle causality interrelationships, also to 
challenge the efficient market hypothesis in this respect. Over the last years, important 
contributions have been taken up: business cycles, the globalization of financial markets 
and behavioral finance. 
 
The knowledge of this causality is relevant information for many market participants. 
The recognition of the relationship between monetary policy and stock prices is espe-
cially important for decision-makers of monetary policy. The European Central Bank’s 
(ECB) expressed main object is price stability. According to the ECB, the definition of 
price stability is to hold inflation rates below, but close to, 2 % over the medium term 
(ECB 2004). Stock market development is used in monetary policy decision-making 
process because it indicates the development of real economy and the uncertainty of 
future expectations (ECB 2010a). Central banks’ price stability-target gives benefits 
also to the stock markets. According to Bernanke and Gertler (1999) and Cassola and 
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Morana (2004), keeping up the price stability is working aid in long term when aspired 
to avoid stock market volatility in advance. 
 
Secondly, consciousness of the causality is relevant information for both stock holders 
and active traders. Some investors may see monetary policy to be so trivial or exoge-
nous that it does not affect to their trading decisions. However, Conover, Jensen and 
Johnson (1999a; 1999b) show that it could be useful to abuse different status quos of 
countries’ monetary economies when doing allocation decisions of internationally di-
versified stock portfolio. Konrad (2009: 112) argue that monetary developments can be 
useful when estimating future asset prices and volatility. More precisely, the varying 
response of several asset classes may be essential for investors’ asset allocation. Ac-
cording to many prior studies, the intensity-level of how monetary policy affects to 
stock price depends much on the firm characteristics underlying the stock. That may be 
significance in investors’ trading decisions. Finally, it may find out that research done in 
this subject matter has partly evolved the efficiency of financial markets.  
 
Although the subject matter is widely investigated, studies have strongly focused to the 
U.S regardless of time. The largest part of studies has been executed from the outset in 
the U.S. stock market and by force of the Federal Reserve’s (FED) monetary policy. 
Even if the economies of China and other developing countries grows extraordinarily 
compared to developed countries, the U.S. economy is still for the present the world’s 
largest and followed and the combined value of its stock exchanges is over 40 % of the 
world’s all stock exchanges’ value (World Federation of Stock Echanges 2010: 102). In 
addition, economic changes in the U.S. are strongly reflected in all other economies at a 
considerable rate. These reasons make very followed and a big deal about the U.S. 
economy, especially in financial markets all over the world.  
 
When approaching this subject, some noticed facts have to be taken into consideration. 
Firstly, it has been found that the FED’s monetary policy affects also in the euro area to 
some extent. (see Ehrmann & Fratzscher 2003) Secondly, the monetary policies of the 
FED and the ECB (or any other developed countries) are correlated, mainly because the 
world economy and its pursuits are more and more integrated and globalized. For ex-
ample, Conover et al.’s (1999a) finding is that the stock markets of many countries are 
more strongly related to the FED’s monetary policy than to local monetary policy. The 
research included, on top of the U.S., 15 other OECD countries. Significantly higher 
returns were found in these countries during the FED carried out expansive monetary 
policy. Ehrmann and Fratzscher’s (2009) similar investigation support prior cross-
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country findings. Even 30–35% of the variations in global equity markets on the partic-
ular days can be explained by monetary shocks incurred by the FED. Ehrmann and 
Fratzscher (2003) find as well that the money markets of the U.S. and the Europe have 
converged, become interdependent and more integrated during 1993–2002, though the 
FED’s monetary policy was anyway the determinant. There are three explanatory fac-
tors for discrepancy between local stock markets’ sensitivity to the FED’s actions: first-
ly and primarily, integration into the international financial markets, secondly integra-
tion of real economy into the U.S. economy and thirdly the flexibility of exchange rates 
(Wongswan 2009: 360). 
 
 
1.1. The purpose of the thesis 
 
This thesis is focused on the causality between the ECB’s monetary policy and the Eu-
ropean stock markets. To be exact, the main purpose is to find out whether there occur 
asymmetric price responses among sample stocks to the Governing Council’s decisions 
and announcements about the level of key interest rates. Certain characteristics of a firm 
are suggested to have an influence to conceivable price behavior. The approach is to 
measure whether sample stock portfolios are susceptible to the monetary policy surpris-
es. To define surprise component, the financial markets’ expectations deviation from the 
realized change is calculated. In addition, the aim is to argue why certain stocks may 
behave in certain ways. 
 
Second purpose is to investigate what role plays positive and negative surprise compo-
nents separately taking possible nonlinearity into account. Enclosed to the main pur-
pose, evidence may expose whether monetary policy actions have asymmetric circum-
stantial effects on stock prices. 
 
Based on many previous studies related to the causality under discussion, the bases for 
the hypotheses development can be specified. Firstly, the stock returns of small, finan-
cial constrained or unprofitable firms (compared to firms with inverse characteristics) 
are expected to be in inferior position when changes in the key ECB interest rate take 
place. Secondly, the recent evidence is ambiguous whether stocks are more responsive 
to positive or negative monetary surprises.  
 
Considering that the relationship is much investigated in the last decade, as mentioned 
in the introduction, it has to confront the necessity of the existence of this study. The 
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other fact mentioned in the introduction, that the most of studies has been done through 
the U.S. markets allows eligibility to examine whether the findings are in effect also in 
the euro area. Blinder, Ehrmann, Fratzscher, Haan and Jansen (2008) find that the de-
sired direction of monetary policy announcements on markets are too little investigated 
and ensure robustness is required. In addition, they hold the view that the effects have 
been investigated in too few countries for too short time periods.  
 
The last contribution is to add the profitability of a firm to the study. As far as is known, 
the conceivable difference of the stock’s response depending on firm’s profitability has 
not been gone through in open academic discussion. This factor is tested in many stud-
ies implicitly but not distinctly. The thesis introduces also the comparison between the 
relative importances of various firm characteristics.  
 
Note on explanatory power in the context 
 
The ECB’s monetary policy announcements are always well-anticipated and surprise 
component is typically small which leads to situation where suitable models have low 
explanatory power. Therefore, the aim is not to maximize information or provide quan-
titative interpretations from empirical results but investigate the existence of proposed 
stock asymmetries in general.  
 
 
1.2. Research hypotheses 
 
When approaching the subject empirically, four hypotheses are identified. These hy-
potheses are constructed on the grounds of the theoretical frameworks and the empirical 
results of prior studies. In compliance with prior results, the hypotheses ought to receive 
confirmation. The hypotheses of this study and reasons for them have been listed in the 
following item. The summary of prior studies connected to hypotheses 1, 2 and 3 is pre-
sented in table 1 and table 3 summarizes studies connected to hypothesis 4.  
 
 
H1: The extent of stock’s response to monetary policy surprise depends on firm 
size. 
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This hypothesis is a mainly consequence of the sense of the credit channel. At first, 
shifts in the key interest rate influence banks’ lending in depth. The cost of commercial 
banks owned liabilities changes. Accordingly, simultaneous adjustment is obliged to 
happen in banks’ assets. Commercial banks must reduce holdings or add funds, other-
wise lending must reduce. Borrowing cost from bank or financial markets is therefore 
determined by the key interest rate.  
 
Small firms are more likely to use borrowing from bank (Gertler & Gilchrist 1994: 
313). Especially they suffer from the lack of information in lending. As small firms 
have often difficulties to raise funds from nonbank sources, banks are unsympathetic 
toward them. On the contrary, large firms have more chances to use nonbank funding. 
In addition, large firms have larger net worth to use as collaterals. The better firm’s col-
laterals are the more banks are able to lend or the lower are the loan costs. If small firms 
attain less external financing, their potential to thrive as investors expect diminish.  
 
Other argument is the level of information which affects in credit markets. There exists 
less publicly available information related to small firms. This kind of firm is seen as a 
risk in credit markets. Banks are not disposed to lend without necessary information and 
reduce lending first to risk firms in tightening credit conditions. (Gertler & Gilchrist 
1994.) 
 
The evidence of Kashyap, Stein and Wilcox (1993) shows that tightening monetary pol-
icy causes increase in nonbank loans at the expense of bank loans. This implicates the 
sources of loans being imperfect substitutes, which appears as a gap between loan costs. 
Oliner and Rudebusch’s (1996) competing view is that since monetary policy turn to be 
contractive both bank and nonbank loans shift from small firms to large firms.  
 
Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) show that contractive monetary policy causes worse media-
tions to small firms than to large firms. The asymmetry is more remarkable in reces-
sions. They argue that small firms’ sales and borrowing reduce and their interest rates 
on loans increases relatively more than large firms. The asymmetry does not arise from 
firm size itself. Instead, young firms which may have a high degree of idiosyncratic risk 
or inadequately collateralized firms are on average small firms. Thus borrowing costs 
due to these primitive factors are relatively high. However, many other studies have 
noticed the asymmetry between small and large firms (see Thorbecke 1997; Perez-
Quiros & Timmermann 2000; Ehrmann & Fratzscher 2004).  
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H2: The extent of stock’s response to monetary policy surprise depends on firm’s 
debt-equity ratio.  
 
 
First way of thinking is that a change in the key interest rate influences directly on bal-
ance sheets through cash flows of interest and the value of collateral assets. Indirectly, a 
change brings about a change in firms’ spending at the same time which reasserts chain 
of events (Gertler & Gilchrist 1994: 311–312). On the other way, second hypothesis is 
based on banks’ way to calculate cost of risks for lending. Suitable structure of balance 
sheet and high equity ratio of firm are favorable from bank’s point of view. This kind of 
debtor is priced to have less default risk. Thereupon, the amount and costs of bank loan 
are more likely near to investors’ wishes.  
 
The amount of debt is a trade-off for firm. Excess debt may increase the production 
scale and expected future profits. On the other hand, the volatility of profits will in-
crease too. Cooley and Quadrini (2006: 244) argue that debt-equity ratio and firm size 
are connectable conversely because firm with less equity is willing to raise profits by 
using leverage. This may be determinant in asymmetric reactions to monetary policy.  
 
Lamont et al. (2001) do not find any significant results about the role of financial con-
straints factor in stock prices’ reactions to monetary policy. However, they suppose that 
the factor is important and the results may be due to the rudimentary tests (Lamont et al. 
2001: 550). Later, some studies support that financial constraints causes asymmetric 
reactions in stock markets (see Ehrmann & Fratzscher 2004; Basistha & Kurov 2008). 
Also, Basistha and Kurov (2008) find that highly indebted firms react similar to the av-
erage firm but firms out of debt react the most. Although the financial constraints factor 
is not equal to the financial standing, the linkage is obvious.  
 
 
H3: The extent of stock’s response to monetary policy surprise depends on return on 
assets-ratio.  
 
 
Third hypothesis takes the need of credit into consideration. Firm financing can be sepa-
rated to internal and external. Profitable firm is more likely able to use internal financ-
ing for its operations or investment spending. Instead, firm which performs poorly is 
likely to resort external financing. This implicates borrowing from banking sector, 
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which expose firm to impact on credit channel. In addition, changes in common interest 
level determined by central bank have a bearing on interest payments of the firm’s debt 
and thus following profits (Cooley & Quadrini 2006: 245).  
 
Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1996) account implications which induce asymmetric 
responses on stock prices. Firstly, external financing is always more expensive than 
internal finance (Hahn and Lee 2009). Secondly, if a firm is unable to make a good im-
pression in credit markets or its costs of lack of information are high, it is in worse situ-
ation than capable firm. This asymmetry is strongly related to the amount of net worth 
and its inverse relationship to the cost of external finance. Net worth is therefore im-
portant determinant when defining credit terms. Failed borrowing prejudices firm’s op-
erations or investment spending.   
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Table 1. A summary of asymmetric stock market reaction to monetary policy. 
Study Time period Monetary policy measure Dependent variable Conclusions 
Gertler &  
Gilchrist (1994) 
1958-1994 Federal Funds rate Quarterly financial 
 reports for manu-
facturing corpora-
tions 
• Small firms suffer more on 
tightening monetary policy 
because worsening balance 
sheet positions makes borrow-
ing difficult  
Thorbecke (1997) 1953-1990 Nonborrowed  
reserves  
Federal Funds rate 
Stocks of CRSP 
value-weighted 
index 
• The impact of monetary shock 
on stock price increases as the 
firm size becomes smaller 
         
Perez-Quiros & 
Timmermann 
(2000) 
1954-1997 1-month Treasury  
bill rate 
Money supply 
Stocks of CRSP 
value-weighted 
index 
• Small firms suffer more on 
tightening monetary policy 
     
Lamont, Polk & 
Saá-Requejo 
(2001) 
1968-1997 Log real M2  
Federal Funds rate 
Federal Reserve  
discount rate 
Commercial paper- 
treasury bill spread 
Stocks of NYSE, 
AMEX and 
NASDAQ 
• The reactions of financial 
constrained firms to monetary 
policy (measured by abnormal 
returns) do not differ from 
unconstrained ones 
     
    
     
Thorbecke & 
Coppock (2001) 
1974-1979 
1982-1989 
Federal Funds rate 
Nonborrowed  
reserves 
Stocks of NYSE • Contractive monetary policy 
decreases both small (larger 
effect) and large firms’stock 
prices 
• Expansive policy increases 
stock prices only stock prices in 
large size-class 
        
Guo (2004) 1974-1979 
1988-2000 
Federal Funds rate Stocks of NYSE, 
AMEX and 
NASDAQ 
• The asymmetric stock market 
reactions depending on firm 
size are related to common 
business condition: "size effect" 
is evident during non-favorable 
times but not during favorable 
ones 
     
Ehrmann & 
Fratzscher (2004) 
1994-2003 Federal Funds future Stocks of  
S&P500 index 
• The more financially con-
strained firm is the more sus-
ceptible it is to monetary policy 
     • Highly indebted firms react 
similar to the average firm but 
firms out of debt react the most 
• Firm’s with high Tobin’s q  
are more susceptible to mone-
tary policy 
• Firms with a high P/E ratio are 
more susceptible, possibly due 
to the sensitivity of earnings 
expectations to the changes in 
interest rates 
     
     
Basistha & 
Kurov (2008) 
1990-2004 Federal Funds future Stocks of  
S&P500 index 
Financially constrained firms 
are more responsive than un-
constrained ones to monetary 
shocks 
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H4: The positive monetary policy surprises affect stock prices differently from neg-
ative surprises. 
 
 
Overreaction Hypothesis proposes that financial events are reacted systematically too 
exaggeratedly in stock markets, not depending whether the news is good or bad (Ajayi 
& Mehdian 1994: 533). Instead, Brown, Harlow and Tinic’s (1988) theoretical model, 
Uncertain Information Hypothesis, proposes that stock prices react to bad news more 
pronounced than good ones. This is due to the investors’ manner to set the stock prices 
below their fundamental prices. Both hypotheses are against to the Efficient Market Hy-
pothesis.  
 
 
 
Figure 1. Asymmetry between gains and losses. 
 
 
Ding, Charoenwong and Seetoh (2004) investigate the asymmetric stock return patterns 
towards firms’ positive and negative earnings surprises. Their findings lean on the ad-
vance of Tversky and Kahneman’s (1979; 1991) prospect theory. Illustrated in figure 1, 
investor suffers more for a loss than enjoy for the equal amount of win. Thereupon, a 
negative surprise that struck investors makes them refrain to realize their loss but hope 
that a stock would recover. This diminishes trading and stock’s bid price does not de-
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crease in line with fundamental value. On the contrary, a positive surprise encourages 
realizing investors’ profits. Incidentally, the theoretical framework suggests decreasing 
returns to scale for both positive and negative surprises. That is, the function is concave 
for positive surprises and convex for negative surprises but stickier for negative ones.  
 
As Tversky and Kahneman (1979) argue, investors tend to perceive gains and losses 
through the reference point in origin. The hypothesis in this study proposes that gains 
and losses can be transformed to the positive and negative surprises of monetary policy 
announcements (figure 2) as Ding et al. (2004) do to the firm’s reported earnings. 1 
 
 
 
 
 
The evidence from the other subject matters supports this theoretical framework. Ding 
et al. (2004) show that positive earnings surprises produces significant abnormal stock 
                                                 
1 Usage of terminology in signs is confusing in prior literature. The majority of those discuss a positive 
surprise as rise in interest rates (or bad news for stock markets) and vice versa. In this study, positive 
(negative) surprise in monetary policy is viewed as positive (negative) for stock markets. The reader must 
bear this in mind through the thesis. 
Figure 2. Asymmetric effects between the directions of the surprises. 
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returns while negative surprises are insignificant. Prior study of Shefrin and Statman 
(1985) also notice that investors are reluctant to sell loser stocks but bid up stock price 
after a positive earnings surprise. The opposite way of thinking suggests that a negative 
surprise (for stock markets) has larger impact to the downward movement in stock pric-
es than equal positive surprise has to the upward movement. This is connected to the 
understanding that stock markets overreact to the bad news and underreact to the good 
news (Brown, Harlow & Tinic 1988).  
 
There are some surveys related specifically to asymmetries in the directions of monetary 
policy surprises. Lobo (2000) finds limited signals about the asymmetric effects of 
monetary announcement to daily S&P500 stock prices during 1990–1998 by using fed-
eral Funds rate as an explanatory variable. The results are consistent with Ding et al.’s 
(2004) ones.  
 
Lobo’s (2002) further examination with a similar data shows that positive surprises 
have significant impact on stock returns while negative surprises are insignificant. In 
addition, only negative surprises are found to impact on volatility. Farka (2009) focus 
on the same subject matter using intraday data of S&P500 index futures and Federal 
Funds futures. The evidence indicates that easing surprises have larger impact than 
tightening ones. Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) touch the issue but do not find statistical-
ly significant difference between the sign of the surprise or the direction of the rate 
change. 
 
Vähämaa and Äijö (2011) separate surprises that occur in VIX implied volatility index 
data and driven by the FED’s monetary policy. They point out that a negative target rate 
surprise increases stock market uncertainty but a positive one decreases it. The market 
reaction to surprises tends to be more remarkable during economic downturns or expan-
sive policy cycles.  
 
Chuliá, Martens and van Dijk (2010) used high-frequency intra-day data and find strong 
evidence that negative surprises cause stronger impact on stock markets than positive 
ones. In fact, the mere occurrence of negative surprise tends to be more important than 
its magnitude. For positive surprise, the magnitude is principal. 
 
Conrad, Cornell and Landsman (2002) find that stock responses to news depend on pre-
vailing price level of the markets. Prices react aggressively to bad earnings news and 
moderately to good news in bullish markets. In addition, small firms are quite immune 
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to the overreaction for the bad news. Since small firms’ earnings fluctuate relatively 
much over time, the news may have lower information content so a relation between 
surprise and excess returns is hard to detect (Conrad et al. 2002: 2529). 
 
Firm’s earnings announcements and monetary policy announcements have many simi-
larities. The following list shows that it is justifiable to expect that stock prices react of 
the same kind and parallel to monetary policy announcements than earnings announce-
ments reported by Ding et al. (2004). By contrast dissimilarities are delineated to chal-
lenge the ability to find significant results from monetary policy-stock markets interrela-
tionship. 
 
 
         Table 2. Monetary policy–earnings announcements comparison. 
Similarities 
• Information is public at the same time for the entire markets 
• The date of announcement is known in advance 
• The markets make assumptions about future path from the news 
• Though monetary policy is not straight related to single firm, the implicit 
   influence come up from the transmission mechanism 
  
Dissimilarities  
• Monetary policy announcements are well-anticipated and surprise  
  component is small. By contrast, earnings announcements have often  
  larger surprise component. 
• The importance of earnings announcements for stock price is larger. 
 
 
Theoretical model contrived by Veronesi (1999) may confuse the last hypothesis fur-
thermore. The model suggests that stock prices overreact to non-favorable news in fa-
vorable times. That pattern occurs because increased uncertainty due to the news causes 
stock prices declines which surpass the actual impact in expected future dividends. Sim-
ilarly, stock prices underreact to favorable news in non-favorable times because the in-
crease in expected future dividends surpasses the discount that investors require to hold 
a stock. The type of news is irrelevant. The theory should hold true in both monetary 
news and other aggregate economic news.  
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Veronesi (1999) show that during recession there exist high volatility in stock markets 
which leads to more uncertainty among investors. Thus, stock prices are more sensitive 
to news in recession than in expansion. This pattern originates from investors’ anticipa-
tions that future cash flows react more easily to news in high uncertainty state. Farka 
(2009) find that non-favorable monetary policy actions have larger impact in favorable 
times than non-favorable ones. Altogether, both theoretical models and empirical evi-
dence related to the fourth hypothesis yield inconsistent results. Therefore, further clari-
fication is needed.  
 
Stocks’ time-varying sensibility to monetary policy surprises is not taken into account 
in the empirical part of this thesis. Nevertheless, the possibility that dynamic states of 
economy may prejudice the results would be desirable to notice hence.  
 
Table 3. A summary of the relevance of the sign of the monetary policy surprise. 
Study Time period Monetary policy measure Dependent variable Conclusions 
Lobo (2000) 1990-1998 Changes in the federal  
Funds rate target 
S&P500 index • Favorable monetary policy 
surprises have relatively larger 
impact on S&P500 index than 
non-favorable ones 
Lobo (2002) 1990-1998 Survey data on market  
participants’ expectations  
3-month Treasury bill 
yield 
S&P500 index • Favorable surprises have 
significant impact on stock 
returns while non-favorable 
surprises are insignificant 
       • Only non-favorable surprises 
are found to impact on volatili-
ty 
Bernanke & Kutt-
ner (2005) 
1989-2002 Federal Funds future Stocks of CRSP  
value-weighted 
index 
• Monetary policy surprises 
causes heterogenous returns 
among industry-based portfoli-
os 
• The sign or the direction of 
the surprise does not have an 
influence on the intensity of 
stock prices reaction 
     
Farka (2009) 1994-2005 Federal Funds future S&P500 futures • Easing surprises have larger 
impact on stock market than 
tightening ones 
        • Tightening surprises have 
larger impact in favorable 
times than non-favorable ones 
Chuliá, Martens & 
van Dijk (2010)  
 
1997-2006 Federal Funds future S&P100 index • Non-favorable surprise leads 
to higher reaction in stock 
markets. The mere occurrence 
of negative surprise is more 
important than its magnitude. 
• For positive surprise, the 
magnitude is prime. 
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The linkage of hypotheses 
 
The hypotheses are pronouncedly interrelated. The firm characteristics may be coexist-
ent and therefore a prime factor is miscible. If the hypotheses are supported, proportion-
al importance of the firm characteristics are taken into account betweentimes. The ar-
guments for the characteristic-related hypotheses are linked up via credit markets and 
information asymmetry
2
. As certain prior studies have focused to differences of indus-
tries, one can argue that an industry is not important per se but the differences arise 
from certain characteristics of an industry.  
 
In this context, a point of the causalities of the firm characteristics is made. Any factor 
does not surely imply that the firm has or not has other factors. For example, the size-
factor does not surely imply that firm is indebted or performing poorly. Instead, the case 
is whether some of portfolios constructed from the factor-based firms have significantly 
different susceptibility to the monetary policy surprises. The examination exposes also 
whether some of candidate portfolios react unequal to positive and negative surprises. 
 
In this case, Hahn and Lee’s (2009) study of financial structure of a firm and stock re-
turns imply that the characteristics related to debt-level and profitability are negatively 
correlated so that the profitability of indebted firms are at lower level. Also, as Cooley 
and Quadrini (2006) note, debt-level and firm size are likely negatively correlated. Par-
ticular description of portfolio construction is given in section 6.2.1. and correlations are 
reported in table 11. 
 
 
1.3. Overview of the thesis 
 
The thesis includes both theoretical and empirical part. Theoretical part is included in 
chapters 2–5. The first chapter contains introduction to the subject and purpose of the 
thesis and research hypotheses as well. In the second chapter, previous accomplished 
research results substantially touching the subject of this thesis have been gone over. 
Third chapter introduces essential ways to price common stocks. In the fourth chapter, 
efficient market hypothesis and three forms of market efficiency has been presented. 
The fifth chapter presents theoretical economic framework to handle stock price move-
                                                 
2 Despite of above-mentioned reasonable theoretical causal-connections, investors’ motivation to trade 
stocks based on these arguments cannot be sustained. One cannot make confident conclusion that inves-
tors rationalize their trading-decisions, which shift stock prices, by fundamental reasons. 
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ments, examines the ECB’s monetary policy actions and their arguments and clarifies 
the structure and channels of the transmission mechanism. 
 
The empirical part begins from chapter six. The data used and statistical methods are 
introduced in this chapter. Chapter seven includes empirical results. The thesis termi-
nates in conclusions in chapter eight. 
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2. PREVIOUS STUDIES 
 
Many surveys have noticed that when stocks are segregated according to fundamental 
aspects there seems to be a wide range of diverse reactions in their response to monetary 
policy. Remarkable reasons for that have been identified. The size of firms (see Gertler 
& Gilchrist 1994; Thorbecke 1997; Perez-Quiros & Timmermann 2000; Thorbecke & 
Coppock 2001, Guo 2004), general financial situations (see Gertler & Gilchrist 1994, 
Ehrmann & Fratzscher 2004; Guo 2004; Basistha & Kurov 2008) and the industry-
specificity (see Ehrmann & Fratzscher 2004; Basistha & Kurov 2008; Becher, Jensen & 
Mercer 2008) are dimensions which govern the strength of reaction to monetary policy. 
Basically, monetary policy affects stronger to small firms, firms in cyclical industries 
and firms with financial troubles. 
 
 
2.1. The importance of choosing monetary policy indicator  
 
In academic literature has been mentioned that the direct effects of monetary policy to 
stock markets is difficult to verify reliably because stocks react to the changed common 
interest level at the same time. It is hard to contrive a measure for monetary policy, 
which would not be correlated with changes in common interest level. (Rigobon & Sack 
2003: 639.) This incurs that common interest level is easily used as a monetary policy 
indicator. However, that is not enough exhaustive measure when measuring stocks’ re-
actions to monetary policy. 
 
Central bank’s key interest rate is useful indicator for (money supply-based) monetary 
policy actions, because it reacts parallel with changes in money supply (Bernanke & 
Blinder 1992: 910). As central banks’ monetary policies are nowadays more interest 
rate-oriented, this conclusion has become even more essential in two decades. By com-
paring international stock indices’ reactions to the various FED’s monetary policy indi-
cators, Mann, Atra and Dowen (2004: 547, 558) make some conclusions about the order 
of superiority of the indicators. As set out in their study, the optimum indicator is differ-
ence in the average Federal Funds rate (or the FED’s interest rate) which is calculated as 
the monthly average Federal Funds rate minus average Federal Funds rate in previous 
month. Central bank’s key interest rates are successful also from an another viewpoint: 
Federal Funds futures are found out to be efficient predictor to the actual forthcoming 
changes in Federal Funds rate (Krueger & Kuttner 1996: 879). However, the usage of 
raw futures data is biased by reason of their risk premia. That incurs distorted forecasts 
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of the future path of monetary policy and measures of monetary policy shocks. This can 
be avoided by using intraday dissections. (Piazzesi & Swanson 2008; Konrad 2009.) 
Other feasibility is to use polls of market participants as Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2004) 
do.  
 
 
2.2. Macroeconomic cycle as an explanation for price behavior 
 
McQueen and Roley (1993) attest that stock markets reactions to monetary policy de-
pend on business cycles. They find that kind announcements of the FED’s monetary 
policy interact only slightly during high states of economy but similar news upraises 
substantially stock prices in depression. In addition, these findings are considered to 
exist due to variability of expectations about cash flows instead of equity discount rate 
proxies. Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) make later the same conclusion about the source 
of the response of stock prices. 
 
Lately, Basistha and Kurov (2008) confirm those findings about the discrepancy of eco-
nomic situations. Their results are remarkable: monetary policy is founded to affect to 
stock prices in recessions over twice as intensively than in favorable states of economy. 
The part of explanation for that is the role of the credit channel and to be exact, tight-
ened credit market conditions. 
 
In expansions, central bank uses tightening monetary policy for counteract the overheat-
ing of economic activity. According to the article by Patelis (1997) in which is exam-
ined the capability of the stances of monetary policy to predict future stock returns, 
stock prices responded more to that tightening than to loosening monetary policy in 
recessions. In poor states of economy firms’ financial health has already impaired be-
cause of diminished borrowing chances and balance sheet income. Patelis’ explanation 
is that if firm’s financial susceptibility to contractive monetary policy actions in future 
increases the required risk premium of firm’s stock increases too. In this case, firm’s 
expected future cash flows, and simultaneously stock price, should increase to compen-
sate weakened health caused by contractive monetary policy actions.  
 
Jensen and Johnson (1995) consider that stocks’ expected returns are at the higher level 
during expansive monetary regimes (or low common interest level) than contractive 
ones (or high common interest level). In the long run, stock returns are better and less 
volatile during expansive regimes. Conover, Jensen and Johnson (1999a) realize as well 
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that in the U.S. and 15 other OECD countries stock returns are greater during expansive 
monetary policy regimes than contractive ones. They connect superiority specifically to 
the monetary policy instead of increased risk premiums. 
 
Järvinen (2000) examines the effect of monetary proxies to Finnish stock prices by sep-
arating different stages of economic situation. While there was bullish cycle in econo-
my, money supply announcement which surpasses expectations decreased monthly 
stock returns but the corresponding reaction in recession was positive. By way of con-
clusion, the better the common economic situation is the more stock prices appear to 
decrease as a consequence of increased money supply. It is suggested that this order is 
caused by increase in the markets’ inflation expectations (which usually leads to tight-
ening monetary policy). McQueen and Roley (1993) find similar results from the U.S. 
markets. However, the worse common economic situation is the more pronounced is the 
negative reaction of market participants to unexpected increase in interest level.    
 
When the reactions of S&P500 index was measured to the changes in the FED’s interest 
rate instruments (the discount rate or the Federal Funds rate), contractive operations 
decreased stock prices in both bearish and bullish trends but the major effects were in 
bearish ones. This occurrence is caused not only by lowering the returns directly but 
also by changing investors’ sentiment. As a conclusion, contractive monetary policy 
increases the probability of switching trend from bullish to bearish. Also, this kind of 
monetary policy decreases the probability of stock markets to keep in bull market but 
increases the probability to keep in bear market. (Chen 2007.) As a parallel, Kurov 
(2009) find that stocks react strongly to monetary policy in bear market but not much in 
bull market. Konrad (2009) has similar returns about the sense of the market sentiment 
on the German stock market volatility.  
 
 
2.3. The sense of firm’s size and financial situation 
 
Thorbecke (1997) attest that small firms’ stock prices are more susceptible to the effects 
of monetary policy as compared to large firms. Similar results has been presented in 
subsequent surveys (Perez-Quiros and Timmermann 2000; Lamont, Polk & Saá-
Requejo 2001; Guo 2004). According to Thorbecke and Coppock (2001), small firms 
suffers relatively more about inflation lowering monetary policy operations, whereas 
large firms benefit more from expansive monetary policy in relative terms. That differ-
ence is caused by large firms’ better success in credit markets all times. The increase of 
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relative utility does not seem to be linear. Researchers find that midsized firms’ stock 
prices increases the most in consequence of expansive monetary policy when broad 
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) index was delivered to several value-weighted port-
folios.   
 
Monetary policy affected more to the small firms’ stocks than to the large ones, in the 
period of 1974–1979, when economy was depressed and inflation high in the U.S. due 
to two oil crises. Compared to the period of 1988–2000, the firm size was less im-
portant. The distinctive factor was found to be firms’ business conditions. In the 1970s 
small firms’ business conditions were generally speaking weak and in the 1990s firms’ 
earnings were better. (Guo 2004.) 
 
Guo’s (2004) supplementary explanation for the previous facts is that in the earlier peri-
od firms were more dependent on debt than later. Liabilities are more sensitive to the 
changes in interest level than shareholders’ equity. High indebtedness toughens asym-
metric between small and large firms, which reflect in stock prices. In years 1988–2000 
small firms had also more undivided profits which deducted asymmetry. Schwert 
(2002) confirms that size and value premiums have diminished significantly in the 
1990s. According to Guo (2004), this is possible because small and value stocks have 
become in time less susceptible to liquidity constraints (in other words, to the debt limi-
tation). That diminishes investors’ required liquidity premium for these stocks.  
 
Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2004) outline that the intensity of the effect of monetary poli-
cy to stock price depends on firm’s financial constraints and investment opportunities. 
Firms with a high Tobin’s q (see appendix 1.) are more sensitive to monetary policy. 
Financial constrained firms (that is to say, firms which potential growth is limited by 
financial realities) react stronger to monetary policy than non-constrained ones. General 
financial constraining measures are size, required return of firms’ various bonds, return 
on assets, the amount of assets and trade credits (Basistha & Kurov 2008: 2613; Al-
meida, Campello & Weisbach 2004: 1802). Contrary to the others, Lamont et al. (2001) 
did not find correlation between financial constraints and monetary policy, which would 
appear higher returns of constrained firms.  
 
Diminished credit granting is the result of tightened monetary policy. Thorbecke (1997) 
notices that small firms have difficulties to borrow money from credit market. Gertler 
and Gilchrist (1994) come to the same conclusion: during recessions and tight monetary 
regimes the credit granting of small firms reduce relatively more than large firms, which 
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reflects in stock prices. According to this study, the turnover and types of property are 
more susceptible to the contractive monetary policy. The pattern is not as powerful dur-
ing expansive monetary policy. 
 
Bernanke and Gertler (1989) investigate why firms have heterogeneous borrowing pos-
sibilities. They notice that the larger is net asset value of a firm, the less risky is the firm 
in front of banks’ eyes. Those firms get loans easier and the more advantageous are loan 
terms. In this case, banks mark the price of small firm’s default risk notable, which 
forces liquidity constrained firms to operate at the inferior production level. Due to the 
diminished production, profits and stock prices of this kind of firms depreciate. 
 
Perez-Quiros and Timmermann (2000) approach the asymmetry of firm size in stock 
pricing throughout the credit markets. In the light of the fact that small firms has not 
great premises to use collaterals or guarantees on loans, they receive less loan and are 
rammed to pay more interest for it. The natural result of that chain of events is decline 
in stock value. 
 
The level of lending is in touch with the quantity of money in circulation, which is un-
der central bank’s control. As documented in the research of Perez-Quiros and Tim-
mermann (2000), money supply is found to be significance factor explaining small 
firms’ stock returns. When the sample stock data distributed to size-sorted portfolios, 
changes in money supply in recession incurred statistically significance changes in port-
folios which included the smallest firms’ stocks while large stocks’ reactions were 
weak. On the contrary, in expansion changes in money supply was insignificant in any 
case.  
 
 
2.4. The sensitivity of industry on monetary policy 
 
The reactions of several industry indices to monetary proxies in Helsinki stock ex-
change (now OMXH) is investigated by Järvinen (2000). The influence of the real mon-
ey supply (which fill in for monetary policy) generated asymmetric reactions. Higher 
than expected thus positive surprises in money supply decreased stock returns while the 
similar news in industrial production elevated stock returns. Likely explanation for that 
is contained in changes in expected future inflation.  
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The combined explanatory power of all macroeconomic news (from which major was 
related to the real money supply or interest level) to shifts in stock prices among indus-
tries was at its lowest 2.4 % (metal and engineering) and at its highest 15.5 % (insur-
ance and investment) and 11.4 % to aggregate market. Cyclical firms did not react sta-
tistically significantly to news about changes in interest level but banks and financial 
sectors reacted twice as strong as aggregate market on average. (Järvinen 2000: 16, 40.) 
On the contrary, financial sectors’ stocks in S&P500 index reacted to changes in the 
Federal Funds rate quite parallel with manufacturing industry (Basistha & Kurov 2008: 
2615). This is not consistent with Chuliá et al.’s (2010) view that the financial sector is 
the most suspectible among industries. 
 
Under survey made through S&P500 index and by force of the FED, cyclical and capi-
tal-intensive industries react repeatedly two or three times stronger to monetary policy 
than non-cyclical industries (Ehrmann & Fratzscher 2004: 721). The sensitivity of the 
demand of firm’s products accounts for that occurrence, traditional interest channel be-
ing anyway relevant. (Basistha & Kurov 2008: 2615). According to Bernanke and Kutt-
ner (2005: 1253), high-technology and telecommunications sectors response to mone-
tary policy half again as strongly as overall, all industries extensive, stock index. Energy 
and commodity industries’ respond were not statistically significant. 
 
Industries appearing outstandingly sensitive to monetary conditions are retail and con-
sumer durables and less susceptible are oil, mining, steel, chemicals and utilities. Ex-
planation for this order is that monetary policy has an influence on such industries as 
whose financial success depends much on consumer discretionary spending. (Becher, 
Jensen & Mercer 2008: 377–378.) Bredin, Hyde, Nitzsche and O’Reilly (2009) support 
that and cite autoparts and household as very sensitive industries to monetary policy. On 
the contrary, Kholodilin, Montagnoli, Napolitano and Siliverstovs (2009) find that con-
sumption services are the most immune sector while telecommunication sector reacts 
the most. Both of these studies are made by using the euro area data and the ECB as 
monetary author. 
 
Overall, the explanations for what ways monetary policy impacts to stock prices can be 
found at firm-level, industry-level and aggregate market level. Stocks react not only by 
fundamental reasons, related to discounted cash flows but also by sentiment.  
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3. DETERMINATION OF STOCK PRICE 
 
In this chapter the ways to determine rational price for a stock is discussed. The behav-
ior of stock market prices follows the equilibrium of demand and supply. The levels of 
demand and supply are determined by market participants’ opinions and interests to 
trade stocks. Under the efficient market hypothesis, the market price of a stock is always 
the most rational price. Basically, there is no situation where this supposition holds 
longer than momentarily (Summers 1986). In reality, the market price can differ from 
the price based on stock valuation models. In addition, stocks are risky security class 
and there is always parallel interrelationship between risk and return. 
 
The traditional “buy-and-hold”-strategy is constructed from the presumption that trad-
ing is unhelpful because stocks have always the most rational price. So, long-term stock 
performance is better when stocks are bought based on fundamental aspects. Specula-
tive investing is situated when an investor’s opinion is that the short-term market price 
deviates from the rational price. In this case a stock is profitable to: 
 
1) buy if the market price is below the rational price defined by a investor 
2) sell short if the market price is above the rational price 
 
Well-known theories expect that market prices of stocks fluctuate hand in hand with 
firm-specific fundamentals. In fundamental analysis stock price is composed of all rele-
vant information. This means mainly the expectations of firm’s operating incomes, 
stock dividends appreciation and susceptibility to risk. Hence, prospects of macroeco-
nomic developments are also relevant information because that affect to earnings 
(Schwager 1995: 565). Stock price should therefore be the present value of future cash 
flows which are based on optimal forecasts (Bodie, Merton & Cleeton 2009: 198). 
 
As it turns out, market sentiment has an effect to stock price throughout prevalent future 
expectations. The trend is prevalent price process to positive or negative direction. Un-
derlying reason is investors’ collective optimism or pessimism. These emotional re-
sponses are not based on fundaments but psychological factors which may lead to mis-
guided market price. (Shefrin 2005: 206.) The information of market sentiment is used 
when market participant is doing trading-decisions based on technical analysis. 
 
There are several frameworks to value intrinsic stock price. Theoretical valuation 
frameworks based on discounting include expected return on capital compared to re-
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quired return (Bodie, Kane & Marcus 2005: 377). The frameworks do not generally 
match to current market price. First explanation is that frameworks are quite simplified 
compared to the complex structures of the financial markets in which stock price are 
pressed by countless separate factors. Secondly, frameworks process stock price on the 
grounds of long-term while stock markets are more like short-term-oriented. (Koller, 
Goedhart & Wessels 2005: 21). 
 
 
3.1. Pricing models based on discounting 
 
On fundamental analysis basis the determinants of stock price can be formulated as 
mathematical formulation (McQueen & Roley 1993): 
 
(1)                      [∑
    
      
|  
 
   
]   
          
where: Pt = stock price at time t 
E[·|ω] = expectation conditional on information available at time t
 Dt+r = paid dividend at time t+r 
 rt+r = required return at time t+r 
 
Stock price represents then the present value of forecasted dividends advanced by using 
all available relevant information. Seeing that future is always uncertain, the results of 
pricing model are uncertain and time-varying. The best defined price is only estimate or 
the result of “the parameters of a conditional probability distribution summarizing the 
various potential outcomes” (Brown et al. 1988: 356).  Dividend represents future re-
turns because it is only actual income which a stockholder gets during holding time. 
Required return is affected by risk involved in investment. According to Capital Asset 
Pricing-model (CAPM), stock’s required return is sum of risk-free return and stock’s 
risk premium. The more risky a stock is the larger becomes the required return (Bodie et 
al. 2005: 283).  
 
Dividend-based pricing models are diverging but the principles are the same. In these 
models future dividends are discounted to the present by required return. Pricing model 
developed by Gordon and Shapiro (1956) allows define stock price by simple factors. 
Gordon growth model (equation 2) represents that stock price is all future dividends to 
infinity discounted by required return minus dividends’ growth rate. The greater divi-
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dend growth is the more valuable is a stock. At the same time, the greater required re-
turn is the lower is stock price. 
 
 
(2)                     
  
   
 
 
where: P0 = stock price at time 0 
 D1 = expected dividend at time 1 
k = stock’s required return 
g = dividends’ growth rate 
 
First problem in the model is the situation in which dividends’ growth rate (g) is larger 
than required return (k). Second problem is that even small miscalculations in forecast-
ing model’s factors cause large deviation in the outcome. (Bodie et al. 2005: 612; 622.) 
 
Possibly more reliable model define exact dividends for few upcoming years and after 
that presupposed constant dividends’ growth rate, as in the Gordon growth model. Divi-
dends can be forecasted more faithfully in the near future than the remote dividends. 
(Blake 2002: 201.) 
 
Free cash flow is firm’s real cash flow which is remained under shareholders’ control 
after taxes. By means of calculation, paid liabilities to interest groups are deducted from 
gained earnings during firm’s accounting period. Free cash flow model is similar with 
Gordon’s growth model but the dividend is replaced as free cash flow and dividends’ 
growth rate as free cash flow’s growth rate. When calculating free cash flow, the im-
portance of firm’s remaining debt has to take into account.  In practice, indebted firm 
has no possibility to use free cash flow as firm’s fashion but it has to be used for pay-
ment of a debt even if the amount of free cash flow would be large. (Bodie et al. 2005: 
634, 643.)  
 
Economic value added (or residual income) method quantify how much book value of 
stock generates added value annually. It may be profitable to buy a stock at higher price 
than its book value is, if its present value of future added values is above the required 
return. Stock price is therefore all expected future added values of a stock discounted by 
required return added on current book value of a stock. (Bodie et al. 2009: 82)  
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3.2. The importance of macroeconomic information 
 
Since monetary policy has significant impacts on stock prices through many channels, 
the proportional importance of policy actions and other macroeconomic factors are con-
sidered in common framework. The examination of financial market responses with the 
aid of intra-day data discloses that two major events are above the others: the releases of 
macroeconomic announcements and monetary policy decisions (Andersson, Hansen & 
Sebastyén 2009). Until now, the research of this topic is rich and has been long-term in 
focus. The large amount of studies and wide-ranging methodology used has led to in-
consistent evidences. Anyway, the majority of variation in stock prices cannot be ex-
plained by macroeconomic news (see Fama 1981; Roll 1988; Cutler, Poterba & Sum-
mers 1989).  
 
Pearce and Roley (1985) find that monetary policy surprises are above the others when 
measuring macroeconomic determinants on their announcements days on stock prices. 
Inflation seems to have a little impact and the role of real activity figures is null. Still, 
monetary policy surprises can explain only a small portion of overall variability of stock 
prices (Bernanke & Kuttner 2005).  
 
Hardouvelis (1987) finds as well that stocks in the U.S. markets were the most affected 
by monetary news when the FED used non-borrowed reserves as policy targeting. The 
responses were not significant anymore since monetary policy changed to borrowed 
reserves targeting. Meanwhile, stocks reacted to the announcements of the trade deficit, 
the unemployment rate and personal income.  
 
Particular intra-day examination of the role of economic news reveals that stock returns 
are affected significantly by money supply and consumer price index (CPI) but not by 
producer price index (PPI), industrial production or unemployment rate. In addition, 
trading volume is not responsive to none of macroeconomic news. (Jain 1988.) 
 
McQueen and Roley (1993) find that in the high state of economy the favorable macro-
economic news lead to negative movements in stock prices. This kind of news leads to 
the fears of an overheating economy, higher inflation and therefore undesirable mone-
tary policy tightening. The forces of those fears surpass the force of higher cash flows 
(or dividends) expectations and stock prices decrease. Again, the similar news may have 
positive influence on asset prices in some states of economy.  
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McQueen and Roley (1993) resolve generalized framework of contest between expected 
future dividends and required return. Their finding is that the response of stock markets 
on macroeconomic news takes place mainly through expected future dividends. 
Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) confirm this process in particular in the case of monetary 
policy actions. 
 
By using daily data from 1977 to 1988, McQueen and Roley (1993) find that S&P 500 
index react significantly only to money supply and inflation indicators.  When states of 
economy are considered separately, significant factors in high state are money supply, 
inflation, industrial production, unemployment rate and merchandise trade deficit. In 
medium state, significant factors are inflation and money supply. In low state, none of 
factors is significant.  
 
Chen, Roll and Ross (1986) notice that some macroeconomic variables can explain a 
proportion of systematic risk in financial markets. The most remarkable variable is in-
dustrial production and the various inflation measures are less weighted. Also Flannery 
and Protopapadakis (2002) put up macroeconomic variables to explain systematic risk. 
Six variables are suggested to serve as risk factor: money supply, CPI and PPI as the 
nominal variables and employment variables, balance of trade and housing starts as the 
real variables. 
 
Unemployment news is found to cause time-varying reactions. Since unemployment 
figures implicate substantial macroeconomic information for stock valuing components, 
the eventual short-run impact depends on the state of economy. Stock prices generally 
increase after news about increasing unemployment in expansion. Again, stock markets 
react negatively to similar news in recession. In expansion, the anticipated impact of 
news on interest rates is determinant. Bad news implicates loosening monetary policy 
and falling interest rates which stimulate stock markets. On the contrary, increasing un-
employment in recession lowers expected future cash flows. (Boyd, Hu & Jagannathan 
2005.) 
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4. MARKET EFFICIENCY 
 
Efficiency in financial markets means that a security price is defined continuously as 
faithfully as it is possible by using all available relevant information. The efficient mar-
ket hypothesis suppose that new information issued to market place adjusts immediately 
to stock prices. Any market participant has not more or better quality of information 
than others so one cannot thereby earn systematically better profits than others. (Bodie, 
Kane & Marcus 2005: 370–371.)  
 
Perfectly efficient markets can be reviewed also by the components: allocative, opera-
tive and informative efficiency. Allocative efficiency means that traded resource is uti-
lized optimally or it is got the market participant who needs it the most. In operative 
efficient markets trading costs are non-existent. That is, trading is not failed due to 
transaction costs. In informative efficient markets the security price involves all availa-
ble relevant information at every moment. (Blake 2002: 389). 
 
 
4.1. Rational expectations and optimal forecasts 
 
Kendall and Bradford (1953) looked systematic elements from stock markets time series 
which would make possible to forecast price behavior. They concluded that this is not 
possible without the market-exterior information. Authors argue that concept of random 
walk could illustrate by claim that time series analysis is as reliable predictor for stock 
price changes at upcoming week than drawing lots.  
 
Rational expectation hypothesis suggests that rational expectations are exactly same 
than optimal forecasts which are formulated by using all available relevant information. 
If information about the fundamental value of a stock changes, simultaneous change in 
the rational expectations affect also to the optimal forecasts. The theory of efficient 
markets assumes that this leads to immediate price changes. Prices in financial markets 
reflect thus the situation in which optimal forecasts corresponds with the equilibrium of 
demand and supply (Muth 1961.) The price adjustment should happen immediately also 
after the release of monetary policy action. As Kendall and Bradford’s random walk, the 
theory of efficient markets requires that upcoming stock price movements are unpre-
dictable.  
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4.2. Efficient market hypothesis and forms of market efficiency 
 
Fama (1970) enlarged substantially the concept of market efficiency. Market efficiency 
was distributed to three classes: filling weak, semi-strong and strong forms. The classes 
are separated for each other by the amount of information. In weak form efficient mar-
kets stock prices are determined by all previously emerged trading information. In sem-
istrong efficient market stock prices involve also all other publicly available information 
related to underlying firms. In strong-form efficiency information consists of inside in-
formation related to firms on top of everything else. The forms of classes are realized 
since any market participant cannot use information to gain systematically abnormal 
returns. (Bodie et al. 2005: 373.) 
 
Later Fama (1991) developed tests for measure the fulfilment of forms: tests for return 
predictability (weak form), event studies (semi-strong form) and tests of private infor-
mation (strong form). The surveys in financial markets attest that they cannot fulfil 
weak form but conformity is occurred in asset price behavior. Event studies give evi-
dence that also semi-strong form is rejected in many cases. Strong form remains in 
force, excluding some exceptions. So, many surveys have shown that there is lacks in 
stock markets for filling every forms. (Blake 2002: 394-397.)  
 
 
4.3. Efficient markets in monetary policy context 
 
In accordance with the efficient market hypothesis, market participants are supposed to 
react only to news which involves previously unknown information. Therefore only 
unexpected part of information may shift prices. Market, as a group, has a consensus 
forecast about the disposition and strength of monetary policy action. The deviation of 
the consensus forecast from the actual policy action is therefore unexpected information 
or surprise component. Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) find that expected part of action 
has not impact on stock prices. The more notable the surprise component is the more 
stock prices adjust because changed optimal forecasts about firms’ success. Remaining 
component which is forecasted properly does not affect shifts in stock prices. 
 
Logically, the direction of the reaction depends on what are the market expectations. 
The monetary policy decisions are published regularly at certain moments, so the mar-
ket participants preconceive about upcoming news. Thereupon, the market participants 
have two choices to act: trade stocks exploiting the expectations or wait and act until the 
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news is published. This decision-making process depends on what are one’s interests 
and the level of uncertainty.  
 
Aggarwal, Mohanty and Song (1995) test whether the market watchers are able to pro-
duce rational forecasts about macroeconomic variables. They notice that there exists 
large amount of variables (involving monetary policy indicators) which are forecasted 
systematically against rational expectations hypothesis. Today, the transparency of cen-
tral banks has led to small forecast deviations.  
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5. THE ROLE OF MONEY AND THE ECB MONETARY POLICY  
 
Central banks are monetary authorities which establish the quantity of money and its 
price (or interest) in economy. In the euro area monetary policy is controlled by the joint 
central bank of the EU member states. National central banks operate therefore as mid-
dlemen of monetary policy. Elsewhere world central banks and monetary policy pursu-
ing are under national authority. 
 
Central bank controls the quantity of money in circulation and interest rate by money 
supply. This action is way to execute main targets, primarily maintain price stability and 
after that sustainable economy growth, high employment and the stability of financial 
markets, interest rates and exchange rates. The harm of general price level rise or infla-
tion is found to be so notable that central banks are ranked the control of it to the main 
object. The basis for inflation is the excess growth in money supply. (Mishkin 2007: 
393, 635.) 
 
Central banks use intermediate targets to overtake final targets. These consist of the 
growth of money aggregates or various types of market rates or exchange rate. To 
achieve intermediate targets, operational targets are used. These targets are to achieve 
by using monetary policy instruments. Central banks’ salient instrument is the level of 
interest. The concept is presented in table 4. The ECB focuses to bolded phrases above 
all. (Bindseil 2004; de Grauwe 2007.) 
 
The business cycles largely stipulate the sort of monetary policy used. Central bank tries 
to smooth business cycles, thus economy growth would be as stable as possible. In ex-
pansion the economy activity can be worried to turn overheated and inflation grew. In 
this case, central bank uses contractive or tightening operations. This leads to rise in 
interest rates and economy activity weakening. In recession economy activity and infla-
tion are low so central bank uses expansive operations. Interest rates are reduced in or-
der to grow economy activity. (Mishkin 2007: 9, 106; Durham 2001: 2.)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
39 
 
           Table 4. Central bank’s targets 
Operational targets  
• Short-term interbank interest rate 
• The liquidity in the banking industry 
• Foreign exchange rate 
Intermediate targets  
• Monetary aggregate (M1 or M3) 
• Credit in circulation 
• Capital markets interest rates 
• Exchange rate 
Final targets  
• Price stability 
• Economic growth 
• Employment 
• External balance 
 
 
5.1. The equilibrium of money demand and money supply 
 
The key information of money demand and supply ought to bring out in order to under-
stand the formation of monetary equilibrium. The theories related to monetary economy 
and those schools that support them are out of tune with the others partly.  Keynesian-
ism argues that balancing processes in economy may last a long time. To aid this, econ-
omy policy is capable to accelerate the process by influencing economy aggregates. 
Monetarism claims that the self-balancing process of economy is fast. Hence, economy 
policy is more often than not only disturbing while market mechanism runs balancing. 
New classical macroeconomics assumes that nominal quantities are perfectly flexible 
and the markets are always in the equilibrium. Under these assumptions only surprising 
economy policy can impact on markets but even then only for a short time. (Stein 
1981.) Regardless of school, two universally accepted major notices are that:  
 
 Money demand depends on level of nominal interest rate. 
 Money demand is not constant for neither short-term nor long-term. (Mishkin 
2007:511.) 
 
Three functions are distinguished for money: a store of value, a unit of account and a 
medium of exchange. (Mishkin 2007: 50). The money capability to serve as a medium 
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of exchange gives the money demand because it open the way for transactions. The 
quantity theory of money suggests that money is neutral. Money has not therefore any 
absolute value but its role is premised on its usability as a unit of account of commodi-
ties. (Burda & Wyplosz 2001: 180.) 
 
Money demand equals the quantity of money that economic participants wish to hold at 
the moment under the existing economic conditions (Howells & Bain 2008: 266). The 
theoretical money demand function for short term can be formulated as: 
 
(3)               
 
where:  M/P Real money supply (involving nominal money supply M and  
  price level P) 
 Y Level of output 
  i Common level of interest  
  c Transaction costs of money 
 
Money demand increases as economy activity or output aggregate increases and as the 
transaction costs of money increases. Increase in common level of interest decreases the 
money demand and vice versa. These permanent money market equilibriums are illus-
trated in following figures: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Simple monetary equilibrium model. 
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The figure on the left-side presents that as the level of output or the transaction costs of 
money shifts, nominal interest rate adjust along ceteris paribus. Money supply-based 
monetary policy presented on the right-side gives rise to shift in nominal interest rates 
ceteris paribus.  
 
In the long run, equation (6) can be shortened. The transaction costs (c) are fixed and 
nominal interest rates (i) have not trend in the long run or money supply is aimed to 
adjust to increase in output. Equation (7) implicates that the money demand increases 
only if there happens increase in real output aggregates and the equilibrium requires 
price level adjustment to nominal money supply. 
 
(4)            
 
A change in money supply causes disequilibrium from money demand in the money 
market. The readjustment of money demand to money supply comes about through 
changes in the economy. (Howells & Bain 2008: 267.) This process is gone over in fig-
ure 4 and more detailed in table 5. The table based on Bernanke & Blinder (1988) study, 
shows how shocks (rows) effects on some aggregate variables (lines).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The elasticity of money demand as to interest rates determines whether the readjustment 
take place through them (Keynesian view) or through aggregate demand (Monetarism 
view). As many surveys have found out, the theoretical framework of money demand is 
unrealistic. To boot, present common way to execute monetary policy through short-
term interest rates reduces the importance of the money demand-supply-equilibrium 
(Walsh 2003: 4). However, the basic idea of the relationship between equilibrium and 
Figure 4. The readjustment in money market disequilibrium. 
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level of interest associated with monetary policy prepare the way to understand the huge 
authority of central bank in the economy.  
 
 
Table 5. The effects of shocks on aggregate variables. 
Rise in: Income Money Credit Interest rate¹ 
Bank Reserves + + + − 
Money Demand − + − + 
Credit Supply + + + + 
Credit Demand − − + − 
Commodity Demand + + + + 
¹On bonds         
 
 
The quantity theory of money 
 
The quantity theory of money is based on Fisher equation (Mishkin 2007: 494):  
 
(5)                            
 
where:   M The amount of money (nominal money supply) 
V  The velocity of circulation of money (The amount of times 
of one money unit) 
P  Common price level 
T  Amount of transactions (level of output) 
 
The velocity of circulation of money (V) is constant for short-term, so it is fixed and 
self-sufficient from other factors of the equation. Amount of transactions (T) is inde-
pendent from money supply (M) in long-term. That is, the real GDP and monetary fig-
ures are independent of each other. In the circumstances, remaining money supply (M) 
expounds entirely common price level (P): 
 
(6)       
 
Thus, the amount of money has not any real impacts or impacts on purchasing power. 
Under the theory, interest level has not impact on money demand either, and monetary 
policy is useless. Although expansive monetary policy would upraise equity prices in 
nominal terms, real effect on money demand did not happen. The examination of money 
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aggregates presents that the velocity of circulation of money fluctuate much that dis-
credits the quantity theory of money partially. (Mishkin 2007: 493-496.)  
 
For the success of monetary policy, the behavior of the money demand-function is es-
sential to know. Nonlinear observed function set down the challenges for its usability as 
the aid for monetary policy. The exercise of the amount of money as an only monetary 
policy resort is not therefore effective. The more varying the velocity of circulation of 
money is the more susceptible is money demand to interest level. Central bank is re-
quired to be able to pitch the accurate interest level so the impacts on money demand 
would be desired. (Mishkin 2007: 492; 509–511.) 
 
Neither central bank’s way to control the amount of money nor money demand is the 
only determinant of the money in circulation or monetary shocks. There may happen 
endogenous changes in commercial banks’ credit supply. While central bank is up to 
stimulate financial markets by monetary policy action, the intermediaries of money may 
diminish the effect by setting own confines for lending. This is due to changes in inter-
est margin (changes in competition) or redistribution of risk (securitization) (Goodhart 
2009: 62, 66.) Therefore, prevailing state of banking sector makes demand for further 
expertise of the monetary analysis.  
 
 
5.2. The basic information of the ECB 
 
The ECB started effective operations in January 1999. Since then the ECB has been 
responsible for the monetary policy of the euro area. At that time Economy and Mone-
tary Union (EMU) had 11 member states. Finland has been a participant from the out-
set. Nowadays 16 countries are members of the EMU and part of integrated monetary 
policy. These participants are adopted the euro currency. The whole system which in-
cludes the ECB and all European Union member countries’ central banks (non-euro 
countries as well) is called the European System of Central Banks (ESBC) (Scheller 
2006: 25-28, 42.)  
 
The strategy makes sure that the ECB’s monetary policy objectives are efficiently as-
pired. First function for the strategy is to argue policy decision-making process. The 
strategy arranges sufficient information and analyses for the Governing Council to exe-
cute policy that attain objectives. Secondly, the strategy is tool related to the communi-
cation with the public. The monetary policy strategy is based on a broad economic anal-
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ysis and a monetary analysis. That allows using monetary policy tools when controlling 
price stability. (ECB 2010a.) 
 
The decisions of monetary policy actions are made by the Governing Council and the 
Executive Board. The Governing Council consists of the governors of the national cen-
tral banks of the 16 euro area countries and members of the Executive Board. It works 
up the guidelines and formulates the monetary policy implementation and supervises 
them. That involves decisions about intermediate targets, key interest rates and liquidi-
ty. The Executive Board runs the ECB. It consists of a president, vice-president and four 
members who all are installed for every eight years and the offices are non-renewable. 
The Executive Board carries out the Governing Council’s steered monetary policy, day-
to-day business, prepares national central banks and the meetings of the Governing 
Council. In addition, the General Council is the third organ as a transitional body which 
operates only as long as there are non-euro members in the ESBC. (ECB 2010b.) 
 
 
5.3. The importance of monetary policy transparency 
 
Certain linkage with the direction of causality between monetary policy and stock mar-
kets is troubled to perceive because policy transparency and communication has been 
varied over time. In 1970s the FED did not even publish its monetary policy. The mar-
ket participants marked it only by changes in interest rates. In 1990s monetary policy 
turned to be much more transparency. After 1993 the FED has published its decisions 
about interest rates generally. This can be a part of the diverging reactions in stock mar-
kets at different times. (Guo 2004; Van der Gruijsen 2007.) The ECB is seen to be more 
transparency than the FED even from the beginning of its existence (Blinder et al. 
2008).  
 
Outdated impression was that surprising monetary policy brings good results in econo-
my. At the same time the fear was that transparency would threaten the independence 
and the weight of central bank. Instead, according to the present outlook, predictability 
and transparency of monetary policy are necessary factors when aspired to hold econo-
my stable. Market participants’ decision-making on the grounds of future expectations 
in addition to current realities presents the call for predictability. (Blinder et al. 2008.) 
The transparency of monetary policy has been noticed to be beneficial for the public 
predictability (see Poole, Rasche & Thornton 2002; Poole & Rasche 2003; Kohn & 
Sack 2003). King (2000) suggests that the transparency presents that financial markets 
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are less reacted to monetary policy compared to macroeconomic news. That is also 
wanted because the attention of the market participants should be concentrated on real 
economy figures instead of monetary policy announcements. 
 
Central banks’ main objective, low inflation, place demands for monetary policy prac-
ticing. As inflation consists of expectations, monetary policy has to interact to the ex-
pectations. The way to do this has been perceived to come through by increasing trans-
parency. Transparency can be seen as an informative and open understanding of mone-
tary policy between central bank and market participants. (van der Cruijsen & Eijffinger 
2008.) 
 
Inflation expectations are a result of central bank’s planned and the past inflation. High-
er transparency leads expectations to be more sensitive to the past realized monetary 
policy. The central bank’s chances to use surprising decisions to enliven economy are 
impaired on the other hand. To solve this problem, ambiguity in communication may be 
used. (van der Cruijsen & Eijffinger 2008.) 
 
It is not clear at present how public action and what sort of communication central bank 
should carry on. (Ehrmann & Fratzscher 2007a; Blinder et al. 2008). The central banks 
of New Zealand, Sweden and Norway are the only national central banks which have 
added transparency further by publishing the forecasts of upcoming interest rate paths. 
On top of these central banks, the Bank of England is the pioneer of monetary policy 
transparency (Blinder et al. 2008:8). The monetary policy transparency of three world’s 
most important central banks (the FED, the ECB and the Bank of Japan) deviates slight-
ly. The FED does not externalize exact price stability target or justify entirely the mone-
tary policy actions. The ECB does not publish the proceedings of the Governing Coun-
cil. However, the monetary policy actions of separate central banks do not differ in 
practice. (Gerdesmeier, Mongelli & Roffia 2007: 1815–1816.) 
 
Transparency can be classified to five categories according to Geraats (2002). Political 
transparency states mainly central bank goals, ordinarily inflation targets. Other exposed 
things are central bank independence and the motives of policy makers. Economic 
transparency shows the knowledge about the economy, for example the economic data, 
policy models and internal forecasts. Procedural transparency refers how the procedures 
used to execute monetary policy are stated. The strategy, minutes and voting records are 
published to make procedures clear. Policy transparency involves instant presentment of 
policy decisions and its reasons and future policy paths. Operational transparency 
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means how directly the problems in the implementation of decisions and the macroeco-
nomic disturbances are stated. The types of share information are shared to these classes 
by van der Cruijsen and Eijffinger (2007): 
 
 
  Table 6. The five classes of transparency. 
Political 
•       Goals laid down  
•       Main task is supporting the economy  
•       Main task is supporting price stability  
•       Main goal expressed by a number  
•       Is independent  
 Economic  
•       Provides economic data  
•       Provides economic forecasts  
•       Provides economic models  
 Procedural  
•       Interest rate decisions are made in a clear fashion  
•       Provides comprehensive minutes  
•       Provides voting records  
 Policy  
•       Announces interest rate decisions immediately  
•       Immediately explains the interest rate decision  
•       Tells future policy preferences  
 Operational  
•       Provides information about relevant economic shocks  
•       Provides information about forecasting errors 
•       Provides information about its performance 
 
 
Other impact of transparency is increased concurrence among monetary policy analysts. 
Biefang-Frisancho Mariscal and Howells (2007) find that the improved ability to fore-
cast policy actions is not concentrated on policy itself but inflation rate forecasts. As 
against, Bauer, Eisenbeis, Waggoner and Zha (2006) show that the forecasts of market 
participants have become more concurrence but are not more accurate overall.  
 
The empirical surveys show that procedural transparency can be even harmful from the 
viewpoint of criticality. Meade and Stasavage (2004) argue that the quality of discus-
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sion and debate are possible to decrease. Van der Cruijsen and Eijffinger (2008: 30) 
notice that other types of transparency are favorable. 
Van der Cruijsen, Eijffinger and Hoogduin (2008) find out the optimal degree of trans-
parency which minimizes the inflation persistence. Lower than optimal transparency 
weakens the markets’ inflation forecasts. On the contrary, higher than optimal transpar-
ency confuse forecast makers by excess amount of information. Also, the focus may 
move too much to the suspicion of the quality of their forecast. Accordingly, too high 
transparency leads to diminished quality of forecasts.  
 
 
5.4. The central bank’s communication 
 
The ECB can choose several ways to communicate to market participants. It uses press 
conferences, minutes of the meetings of the decision-making council, monthly bulletins, 
speeches and interviews for expose the details about overall objectives and strategy, the 
reasons for policy decisions, the economic outlook or future monetary policy decisions. 
Deciding short-run central bank communication involves the weighting between official 
statements, reports, minutes and speeches. As against, long-run communication is dis-
closing central bank’s goals and strategies. This fixes also financial markets’ inflation 
expectations. (De Haan 2008.) 
 
The central bank communication requires discretion among different target groups of 
public. According to van der Cruijsen and Eijffinger (2007), there exists a discrepancy 
between the ECB’s actual transparency and its perceptions among the market partici-
pants, even financial experts. This is due to psychological biases and defective 
knowledge about transparency. Authors remind that communication plays a big part of 
managing inflation expectations. Issing (2005) argues that the efficient communication 
should affect markets’ expectations not only over short-run but also over longer periods.  
 
Ehrmann and Fratzscher’s (2007a) comparison between the communications of the 
ECB, the FED and the Bank of England implicates that the markets’ response depends 
on the communication strategy. They find that when informing financial markets about 
monetary policy decisions, the delivery of committee members is more important agent 
than decision-making-process itself. The asset prices react more in the U.S. markets and 
the predictability of policy decisions are higher than in the United Kingdom and the 
euro area. Furthermore, the FED is able to have an influence on markets through both 
monetary policy and the economic outlook. The ECB and the Bank of England can in-
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fluence to financial markets almost merely through monetary policy communication. 
The end results of different policy communications to aggregates are quite similar, so 
there is not necessarily certain type of optimal communication (Ehrmann & Fratzscher 
2007a).  
 
Krueger and Kuttner (1996) attested the possibility to measure the sense of unexpected 
changes in central bank’s interest rates by using the Federal Funds futures. Kuttner 
(2001) found that expected changes do not cause important response on the U.S market 
interest rates. On the contrary, unexpected part was significant determinant. Separable 
surprise from anticipated change in interest rates was measured using futures market 
data. This methodology was contributed to stock markets by Bernanke and Kuttner 
(2005).  
 
Gürkaynak, Sack and Swanson (2005) innovate that two factors of the FED’s monetary 
policy can be separated when measuring the reactions to asset prices. The empirical 
findings show that current Federal Funds rate target is not the only factor which mat-
ters. Future path of policy have an influence through the markets’ expectations of future 
monetary policy actions. That is, exploiting both factors in a controlled way in commu-
nication, the desired outcome is more liable to reach.  
 
Blinder et al. (2008) separate efficient monetary policy communication into “create 
news” and “reduce noise”. Reducing noise means reducing financial markets’ volatility 
through increasing the predictability. Create news means how statements affect expecta-
tions.  
 
Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2007b) mark the most obvious portion of monetary policy 
decision in which the market participants take notice. While the public announcement is 
given 45 minutes before the explanations for decision made at the moment, the latter 
has the larger shift effect and smaller volatility effect on asset prices. Also, the higher is 
common uncertainty about the economy development the slighter is the markets’ reac-
tion to the public announcement. That indicates that the market participants are on the 
watch for the explanations before the reaction. 
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5.5. The most used monetary policy instruments 
 
Central banks have been adopted certain established instruments that supervise econo-
my activity or execute monetary policy. Commercial banks act as a medium when mon-
ey is transferred from central bank to financial markets. In table 6, the simplified bal-
ance sheet of central bank is presented (Mishkin 2007: 334). Liabilities constitute the 
monetary base. Central bank determines currency in circulation (C) and reserves (R) 
which includes bank deposits with the central bank. Money supply is determined based 
on the monetary base but is also affected by the money multiplier which quantifies how 
forceful the shifts in money supply mediate to economy (Freeman & Kydland 2000). 
Central bank trade the government bonds (G) and the discount loans (D) in assets with 
the financial institutions.  
 
 
Table 7. Simplified balance sheet of central bank. 
 
                                    Assets   Liabilities 
(G) Government deposits Currency in circulation (C) 
(D) Discount loans Reserves (R) 
 
 
Open market operations consist of trading with bonds (G) between central bank and 
financial markets. Trading impacts currency in circulation (C) and reserves (R). The 
discount loans (D) are credit for commercial banks granted by central bank. The price of 
this loan is discount rate determined by central bank. Applied interest rate is the rate 
determined by central bank in open market operations. This rate is basically considered 
to be the most followed and the most informative monetary policy instrument because it 
has the straightest impact on common interest level and the quantity of money in mar-
kets. Reserve requirements are quantitative proportion determined by central bank that 
commercial banks are to keep out of operative business. (Mishkin 2007: 221, 375, 378, 
385.) 
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5.5.1. The ECB’s used instruments 
 
Open market operations 
 
The ECB’s main monetary policy instrument is the key interest rates used in main refi-
nancing operations. The main refinancing operations are loans directed on commercial 
banks with a maturity generally one week and are executed weekly. The operations lay 
on more liquidity to the financial markets and cover majority of markets’ liquidity 
needs. Other key interest rates are the rate on the deposit facility (banks use to make 
overnight deposits with the Eurosystem) and the rate on the marginal lending facility 
(overnight credit to banks from the Eurosystem). The key interest rates are informative 
and the most watched ECB’s instrument. The influence on common interest rates take 
place thus through short-term money market rates. (ECB 2010d.)  
 
 
 
 
 
In general, the ECB uses variable rate tenders in main refinancing operations. This pro-
cedure was in use from 28
th
 June 2000 to 8
th
 October 2008. As a response to the lack of 
liquidity and confidence in the latest financial crisis, the auctions were changed to fixed-
rate tenders with full allotment. (Catalão-Lopes 2010: 200–201). However, the auction 
process in the main refinancing operations conducted as liquidity-providing variable 
rate tenders is illustrated in figure 5.  
 
a) The ECB decides the amount of money it wants to loan  
b) Bids are listed as demand curve in which counterparties offer bids about the 
amount of money and rates at which they are able to do transaction 
c) The offered bids below minimum bid rate are discarded 
d) The amount of money is distributed to counterparties in order from the highest 
Table 8. The four types of the ECB’s open market operations. 
51 
 
rate bids until the liquidity is exhausted.  (ECB 2010f.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Standing facilities 
 
Standing facilities are aimed at bounding overnight market rates and signaling the gen-
eral stance of monetary policy. Two standing facilities are available to eligible counter-
parties on their own initiative: the marginal lending facility and the deposit facility. 
Counterparties can use the marginal lending facility to obtain overnight liquidity from 
the national central banks against eligible assets. The interest rate on marginal lending 
facility normally provides a ceiling for the overnight market interest rate. Counterparties 
can use the deposit facility to make overnight deposits with the national central banks. 
The interest rate on the deposit facility normally provides a floor for the overnight mar-
ket interest rate. (ECB 2010d.) 
 
Minimum reserves 
 
Minimum reserves system aim is to balance money market interest rates and determine 
the degree of deposits which commercial banks have to hold on accounts with the na-
Quantity 
Interest rate 
The ECB’s 
minimum bid 
Banks’ bids 
a) Liquidity 
to distribute 
b) 
c) 
d) 
Figure 5. Auction process in the main refinancing operation. 
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tional central banks. The system regulates also the money multiplier. The interest rate of 
the main refinancing operations is paid for deposits. (ECB 2010d.) 
 
 
5.5.2. The ECB publishing the level of key interest rates 
 
In touch with the actual published decision about the key interest rate, the ECB’s presi-
dent introduces the arguments for the decision in monthly press conference. The order 
of the meeting is following: 
 
The Governing Council makes decision about the level of key interest rate in the meet-
ing on the first Thursday of each month. During the first three active years, the Govern-
ingn Council announced the decision about the key interest rate twice a month. The 
ECB publishes this decision on the same day at 13.45 CET. The ECB’s president and 
vice-president hold a binary press conference within 45 minutes, at about 14.30. Firstly, 
the introductory statement goes through the arguments for the just published decision. 
This involves versatile analyses of the substantial economy factors. Subsequently, the 
audience put the questions to the authors in the discussion. (De Haan 2008.) This order 
prepares the way to clarify open issues among the public (Ehrmann & Fratzscher 
2007b). 
 
 
5.6. The transmission mechanism of monetary policy 
 
Monetary policy would be unsafe to carry on if it’s all influences to all real economy 
sectors are not known. The transmission mechanism of monetary policy is developed to 
recognize channels and causalities between monetary policy and economy aggregates. 
However, the amount of frameworks developed (see Bank of England 1999, Kuttner & 
Mosser 2002, ECB 2010e) makes hard to sum up the section for short. Thereby the 
basic framework which is based on Mishkin’s (1995) symposium is presented to clarify 
the ways monetary policy influence on asset prices.   
 
Expansive monetary policy actions are used in the following demonstration of structure 
pattern. Contractive actions are considered to have reversed impacts. Channels are di-
vided to three classes which are collected to figure 6 (Mishkin 2007: 597-604): 
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Figure 6. The transmission mechanisms of monetary policy. 
 
 
1) Interest rate channel: Along with expansive monetary policy real interest rate de-
creases in which case investments increase due to cheapened money price. Invest-
ment is a part of demand-aggregate and its growth leads therefore increase in the 
level of output. Other parts are housing and consumer durable expenditure.  
 
Wealth channels: 
 
2) Exchange rate channel: Decrease in real interest rate corresponds with domestic 
currency devalvation relative to foreign currency. Domestic deposits become more 
expensive relative to deposits denominated in foreign currency. The devalvation 
makes domestic goods favorable and export increases. The growth of net export 
leads to increase in the level of output.  
 
3) Tobin’s q channel: Investors have more disposable money due to decrease in inter-
est rates. The portion of money is channeled to stocks. Stock prices increase due to 
increased demand which leads to increase in Tobin’s q and therefore also invest-
54 
 
ments. The increased amount of investments increases output aggregate.  
 
4) Wealth effect channel: In compliance with Tobin’s q channel, decrease in interest 
rates leads to higher stock prices. Seeing that the portion of consumers’ wealth are 
invested to stocks, their wealth expand. The portion of wealth is invested to residen-
tial housing and land whose prices react similarly than stock prices. Increased con-
sumption is the resultant of the expanded wealth.  
 
Credit channels: 
 
5) Bank lending channel: Expansive monetary policy increases bank deposits. This 
enforces increase in bank loans. Received loans are used to finance investments 
when output aggregate increases.  
 
6) Balance sheet channel: Net assets increase along increase in stock prices. Larger net 
worth leads to better capability to use collaterals. Adverse selection (the lack of con-
fidence consequent of the lack of information in the case of financing firms) and 
moral hazard (firm is using loans to wrong objects, e.g. too risky objects) diminish. 
Accordingly, the amount of loans increases in which case investments and output 
aggregate increase in compliance with bank lending channel.  
 
7) Cash flow channel: Decrease in nominal short-term interest rates lead to the growth 
in cash flows of the market participants. Adverse selection and moral hazard dimin-
ish and the results are the same than in balance sheet channel.  
 
8) Unanticipated price level channel: Since loans in developed countries are nominal, 
the unexpected increase in price level depreciates the actual value of debt. There-
upon, proportional cash flow increases and the results are the same than in balance 
sheet channel.  
 
9) Household liquidity channel: While the value of stocks in households’ possession 
increase the aggregate wealth expands. In this case the probability for embarrass-
ments decrease which leads to the increase in consumer durable expenditure and res-
idential housing or altogether the increase in output aggregate. 
 
Monetary policy therefore influence on stock prices through in more ways than one. 
Firstly, according to traditional interest channel, occurred change in the output affects to 
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a firm’s earnings underlying a stock. The shifts in firm’s expected future earnings shift 
stock price. Credit channels affect to firms future earning by determining constraints on 
debt financing. In addition, households’ consumption in wealth channel stimulates stock 
markets. The straight link to stock prices is occurred also in the effect on firm’s invest-
ments due to change in Tobin’s q. (Basistha & Kurov 2008.) 
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6. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
The data used is proposed in detail in the first part of this chapter. Second part presents 
the basics of econometric models used. Time horizon is limited to the period since the 
beginning of 1999, when ECB started to be responsible for euro area-wide monetary 
policy, to the 5
th
 August 2010. The first published monetary policy decision came up 4
th
 
March 1999. The source of the ECB’s monetary policy of this time scale has been pro-
vided from the Statistical Data Warehouse (ECB 2010c). Stock market data and the Eu-
ribor swap rates are received from the Thomson Financial’s databases with the support 
of the department of Accounting and Finance at the University of Vaasa. The Eonia and 
the Euribor rates are gleaned from the website of the Bank of Finland (Bank of Finland 
2010).  
 
 
6.1. Monetary policy data description 
 
The data of the ECB’s monetary policy actions consists of the daily key interest rate 
values since the beginning of 1999 to the August 2010. During this period, the Govern-
ing Council made 173 decisions on the key interest rate. Several decisions are truncated 
from the data and refined data is largely used in statistical testing. During 1999–2001 
the Governing Council made policy decisions twice a month. The other decision was 
formal and not as informative as the first meeting. These decisions are truncated, expect 
for two observations which are included also to the refined data sample. The governing 
Council decided to shift the key interest rate in the second meeting twice, 16
th
 March 
2000 and 10
th
 May 2001.  
 
There are also two uncommon and excess events which are truncated: firstly the deci-
sion after terrorism attacks in 11
th
 September 2001 and secondly eight decisions after 
financial market crash October 2008. 8
th
 October 2008 the ECB co-operated with other 
central banks and counteracted the imploding of financial markets. The surprise compo-
nents of these two events are out of all proportion due to their timing surprise (also 
Bernanke & Kuttner (2005) excluded several unscheduled observations). The rationality 
of financial markets was momentarily fully confused during finance crisis. Fluctuation 
of stock prices was a consequence of the thorough lack of confidence which is not under 
central bank’s control. Therefore also seven decisions from 6th November 2008 to 7th 
May 2009 are truncated. Finally, the refined data contains 133 observations. On top of 
that, some of monetary policy surprise measures (1 week and 1 month Euribor swap 
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rates) are available until from June 2005. This data sample consists of 63 and refined 
data of 55 observations.  
 
As seen in table 8, majority of decisions does not involve shift in the key interest rate. In 
full data sample, 15 of those were downward shifts (positive to financial markets) and 
16 upward shifts (negative to financial markets). Accordingly, 142 times the Governing 
Council left the key interest rates unchanged. Second panel shows the observations of 
the refined data. Illustrative pattern about the development of the key interest rate can 
be followed in figure 7.  
 
 
Table 9. Changes in the key ECB interest rate 1999–2010. 
Panel a. Full data sample     
Δ Key interest rate Downwards Upwards Unchanged 
0.00 % – – 142 
0.25 % 5 14 – 
0.50 % 9 2 – 
0.75 % 1 0 – 
Count 15 16 142 
Panel b. Refined data sample     
Δ Key interest rate Downwards Upwards Unchanged 
0.00 % – – 110 
0.25 % 3 14 – 
0.50 % 4 2 – 
0.75 % 0 0 – 
Count 7 16 110 
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Surprise component of monetary policy announcement 
 
The examination of the hypotheses requires a surprise component which indicates mar-
gin between financial markets’ expectations and actual shift in the key ECB interest 
rate. Measuring the surprise component requires two assumptions:  
 
1) the published monetary policy decisions are the determinants of changes in the 
measure on publishing days  
2) the measure is not susceptible to market disturbances .  
 
In this study, positive and negative surprises are separated to measure asymmetric stock 
markets reactions.  Positive (negative) surprise arise when the key interest rate 
  
a) decrease more (less) than expected 
b) increase less (more) than expected 
c) does not change when increase (decrease) is expected  
 
 
Figure 7. The key ECB interest rate and short-term rates over the 1999–2010 period. 
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The width of financial markets’ unexpectedness related to monetary policy has been 
measured by using changes in short money market instruments (see Roley & Sellon 
1998; Kuttner 2001; Poole & Rasche 2001, Cochrane & Piazzesi 2002). Sebestyén and 
Sicilia (2005) argue that very short-term money market rates are good proxy to measure 
surprise component of monetary policy. Hassler and Nautz (2008) recognize that the 
Euro Overnight Index Average Rate (henceforth Eonia) follows the key ECB interest 
rate effectively. On the contrary, Bohl, Siklos and Sondermann (2008: 122) argue that 
rates with shorter maturity than one month are unreliable due to their high volatility 
while longer maturities are not sensitive to monetary policy decisions. Perez-Quiros and 
Sicilia (2002:14) also remark liquidity issues in the Eonia rate. In addition, Nautz and 
Offermanns (2007) find that the readjustment of the Eonia rate to the changes in the key 
interest rate depends on spread between those rates and the auction format. For that rea-
son, several measures of surprise component are sampled.  
 
Table 10 shows descriptive statistics of stock index returns on percentage-basis and 
market rates on basis points. The table reveals that the means and standard deviations 
near to zero as the maturity of a market rate increases. Although there is no remarkable 
difference between the means of Euribor rates, standard deviations deviate largely. In-
stead, the means of swap rates diverse. 
 
  
Figure 8. The pattern of emerged market reactions depending on expectations. 
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Table 10. Descriptive statistics of market rates and the EURO STOXX index. 
N of obs.   Mean Std Min Max 
173 EURO STOXX -0.11 1.59 -6.35 5.18 
  Eonia -1.36 8.92 -53.80 63.00 
  Euribor 1 week -0.32 5.30 -20.70 25.40 
  Euribor 1 month -0.44 2.05 -10.40 6.00 
133 EURO STOXX -0.16 1.39 -4.10 3.10 
  Eonia 1.73 6.61 -53.80 11.00 
  Euribor 1 week 0.29 4.53 -20.70 16.60 
  Euribor 1 month 0.27 1.68 -10.40 3.30 
63 EUROSTOXX -0.49 1.78 -6.35 5.18 
  Euribor 1 week swap 1.40 8.96 -36.40 17.50 
  Euribor 1 month swap  -0.27 3.48 -17.70 5.60 
55 EUROSTOXX -0.31 1.22 -3.30 2.04 
  Euribor 1 week swap 3.48 5.02 -3.70 17.50 
  Euribor 1 month swap  0.62 1.49 -2.30 5.60 
 
 
Euro Overnight Index Average rate 
 
The surprise component is firstly measured by using changes in the Eonia. The Eonia is 
reference rate which indicates market rates for overnight unsecured loan transactions in 
interbank markets. The Eonia is defined by using 49 banks with the highest volume of 
business in the euro zone money markets. The Eonia is average rate of these banks’ 
loans weighted by the amount of loans. It is published daily 19.00 CET. (EBF 2010a.) 
 
The daily change in the Eonia is measured on the days when the ECB publishes its deci-
sion about the key interest rate. In equation, KIR denotes the key ECB interest rate. Et-1 
denotes markets’ expectations about monetary policy action the day before the actual 
publishing.  
 
 
(7)                                      
 
 
Account for time-varying KIR-Eonia spread and its volatility is needed. The ECB adju-
dicated in March 2004 to shorten the maturity of main refinancing operations and 
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change the reserve maintenance period. These changes in the ECB’s operational frame-
work have led to reduced speculation in money markets and more permanent KIR-Eonia 
spread. (ECB 2004; Jardet & Le Fol 2007.) Hassler and Nautz (2008) report that the 
spread has increased from 5 (before March 2004) to 8 (after March 2004) basis points 
for no apparent reason. They show that this is likely due to the ECB’s declined control-
lability of the KIR-Eonia spread. Lintzert and Schmidt (2007) show that the most part of 
the spread after March 2004 to August 2006 can be explained by liquidity deficit in 
banking sector. Their important finding about the insignificance of future interest rate 
expectations behind the varying spread allows ignoring the fluctuation. Despite the fluc-
tuating spread, there is no threat for biased results of measured surprise component. The 
widening of the KIR-Eonia spread has gone on slowly over time. Since the surprise 
proxy is measured in daily terms, the widening is unrelevant.  
 
The attention must turn also to the fact that markets do not react only to the raw deci-
sion about the level of key interest rate on the day. On top of that, the ECB publish in-
formation and statistics about economy development overall related to the monetary 
policy decision. Ignoring intraday movements in market rates excludes facts about in 
which part of monetary policy process they react. Prior intraday studies (see Sebastyén 
& Sicilia 2005; Ehrmann & Fratzscher 2007b) share the view that the main effect in 
financial markets comes from the introductory statement. That means the decision itself 
is not as informative as its underlying motives published in press conference. Further, 
the more surprising is a decision, the larger are the anticipations to the arguments. 
(Ehrmann & Fratzscher 2007b.)  
 
Market watchers are eager to forecast upcoming monetary policy actions up to year 
forwards. In general, the next policy action about the key interest rate is well-known. 
Ross (2002) shows that the large changes and cuts in the key ECB interest rate embod-
ied remarkable surprise components during the first three active years of the ECB 
monetary policy. Using the same time period, Perez-Quiros and Sicilia (2002: 38) also 
find that the financial markets can fully predict the ECB’s contractive actions but not as 
well expansive ones. 
 
Euro Interbank Offered rates 
 
Other measures for the surprise component are changes in Euro Interbank Offered rates 
(henceforth Euribor) for one week and one month maturity. The definition of the Euri-
bor is quite similar to the Eonia. The Euribor rate is reference rate that is calculated av-
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erage from 42 representative banks’ quotes for willingness to lend to prime banks for 
certain maturity within the EMU zone. It is published daily 11.00 CET. (EBF 2010b) 
 
Swap rates for one week and one month Euribor are used as well. Those rates have been 
used earlier by Perez-Quiros and Sicilia (2002), Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2007a) and 
Bohl et al. (2008). Euribor swap rates are available from 20
th
 June 2005. Therefore full 
swap data includes 63 observations and refined data 55 observations. The comparison 
with the positive and negative surprises is not made by using swap rates due to the lack 
of observations. When the Euribor rates and swap rates are used, the surprise compo-
nent is calculated similarly as in equation 8. 
 
 
6.2. Stock market data description 
 
Full stock market data contains 2983 daily closing quotations of each stock belonged to 
the EURO STOXX index. The EURO STOXX index consists of approximately 300 
liquid stocks of large, mid and small capitalization companies of 12 Eurozone countries. 
(STOXX 2010). There exists lacks in stocks’ quotations. A stock is excluded from data 
sample if it does not have quotation on monetary policy decision day or its measured 
characteristic is missing. Therefore the amount of selectable stocks ranges between 224 
(in 1999) to 308 (in 2010). Stocks react largely within the same day the central bank 
announces its monetary action. (Pearce & Roley 1983). This notice allows using change 
from previous day closing quotation to announcement day closing quotation as a stock 
markets’ reaction.  
 
Portfolio construction 
 
The stock characteristics under consideration are firm size, financial standing and prof-
itability and measured by market capitalization, equity ratio and return on assets ratio 
(ratio formulas are reported in appendix 1.). To construct portfolios, the applied way of 
Thorbecke (1997: 638) is used. That is, to define firm’s suitability to certain portfolio, 
its defined suitability-value at the end of previous year is used.  
 
The firms are sorted by fifth based on these characteristics. Every firm included in the 
data is therefore placed to some of the five equally-weighted portfolios for every char-
acteristic. Stock characteristics are updated annually, based on firms’ financial state-
ments. Reasonably, deliberation on the correlation between firm characteristics is need-
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ed. Only weak perceived correlation is found between return on assets and equity ratio 
which implies that higher amount equity relative to debt produces higher profitability 
ratio. Thus there is not the considerable threat of wrong interpretation what factor caus-
es the reaction to surprise in the portfolios.  
 
 
          Table 11. Descriptive statistics of firm characteristics (full data sample). 
  Profitability (%) Size (mil. €) Equity ratio 
 Mean 5.37 11494.430 0.515 
 Median 4.88 4821.726 0.530 
 Maximum 62.35 222876.300 1.057 
 Minimum -274.06 5.863 -3.578 
 Std. Dev. 8.54 18214.540 0.281 
 Skewness -10.46 3.745 -2.208 
 Kurtosis 351.19 25.150 31.150 
 Observations 3445 3303 3529 
CORRELATIONS Profitability Size Solvency 
Profitability 1 
  Size 0.0259 1 
 Solvency 0.2656 -0.0877 1 
PORTFOLIO MEANS Profitability Size Solvency 
Portfolio 1 -1.81 1034.72 0.14 
Portfolio 2  2.60 2443.84 0.39 
Portfolio 3 4.89 4877.79 0.54 
Portfolio 4 7.15 10023.92 0.66 
Portfolio 5 14.29 38890.29 0.87 
      
 
6.3. Methodology 
 
The outline of empirical testing process is following: 
 
1)  The parameter estimates of the effect of monetary policy decisions on stock 
portfolio returns are calculated by using ordinary least squares method in linear 
regression model 
 
2) Seemingly unrelated regressions method is applied to estimate parameters in 
equations 
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3) The Wald coefficient restrictions test is used to check for equality of parameters 
and compare asymmetric effects 
 
4) Multiple regression model and shared data sample is used to test nonlinearity 
and positive and negative surprises separately 
 
The first estimated linear regression model (equation 8) includes observations on the 
days when the ECB published its monetary policy decision about the key interest rate. 
Dependent variable is logarithmic daily change in a portfolio’s value and explanatory 
variable is monetary policy announcement. First three hypotheses are investigated by 
using identical method of implementation. In this part, positive and negative surprises 
are not separated. The baseline estimates are based on simple linear regression model. 
Thereafter regressions are controlled against heteroskedasticity by using White het-
eroskedasticity-consistent estimates. Similar methodology is used in several prior stud-
ies (see Guo 2004; Ehrmann & Fratzscher 2004; Basistha & Kurov 2008). Although not 
reported here, tests made against heteroskedasticity indicate serious variation in error 
terms. 
 
In revised regression model (9) Mt is added and denotes logarithmic stock market index 
return on day t. The examination of the fourth hypothesis differentiates positive and 
negative surprises to separate data samples. The prospect theory suggests also nonline-
arity in the function. Therefore, a quadratic second-order nonlinearity parameter is add-
ed and formulated in equation 10.  
 
(8)                
 
(9)                     
 
(10)                      
    
 
where:  ri,t  = stock portfolio i’s return on day t 
 α  = constant 
 βi = regression coefficient 
 St = monetary policy surprise component on day t 
 Mt = the EURO STOXX index return on day t 
 ε = random error term 
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7. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
This chapter has two sections. Firstly, hypotheses related to the asymmetric reactions of 
stock prices are tested. The asymmetry is directed to firm characteristics: profitability, 
size and solvency. Secondly, different stock market reactions to positive and negative 
monetary policy surprises are tested taking possible nonlinearity into account.  
 
 
7.1. Asymmetric returns of firm characteristic based portfolios 
 
Tables 12 and 13 show the baseline results of testing the hypotheses related to asym-
metric returns. Firstly, table 12 reports the coefficients, standard errors and p-values of 
simple regressions in which the dependent variable is some of the portfolios and the 
independent variable is one of the surprise component measures. In order to satisfy the 
stock price dependence on surprise, estimated coefficients should be positive. In this 
case, the more positive (negative) surprise generates more positive (negative) stock re-
turns.  
 
Surprisingly, the coefficients are systematically negative which suggests that favorable 
surprises cause negative returns in stock markets. This is against the understanding of 
dynamics between interest rates and stock prices. Despite of the fact, interpretations can 
be made based on how the coefficients of portfolios diverge from each other.  
 
All p-values of the regressions in which the independent variable is the Eonia or the 1 
week Euribor are undoubtedly insignificant. The expansion of the coefficients conse-
quent on rates with longer maturities indicates that the rates with very short maturity 
takes only immediate monetary policy surprise into account while longer rates observe 
longer horizon opinions (Farka 2009: 52).   
 
Although only two portfolios in table 12 seem to react to the ECB’s monetary policy 
decisions, the pattern of possible unequal impacts on portfolios can be seen. The strong-
er coefficient and smaller p-values are in touch with lower profitability and worse debt-
equity ratio. Monetary policy decisions do not generate statistically significant returns 
in any size-portfolios.  
 
However, as portfolio returns are set on logarithmic basis, the interpretation of coeffi-
cient estimates is that as the magnitude of a surprise is 100 basis points, the portfolio 
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return in percentages is beta coefficient multiplied by 100. In some studies, some kind 
of rules of thumb is offered how much stock market moves if given degree of surprise 
occur. Bernanke and Kuttner (2005), Basistha and Kurov (2008) and Farka (2009) all 
conclude that theoretical 100 basis points target rate surprise leads to 4–6 percent 
movement  in the aggregate level of the U.S stock markets. Portfolios named as Solven-
cy 1 and Profitability 1 tend to react twice as strongly, generating 10–12 % price 
movement, but to the irrational direction. Anyway, standard errors are quite large for 
every coefficient reported in table 12. 
 
 
Table 12. The effect of surprises on stock returns (full data). 
 
Eonia     Euribor 1 week   Euribor 1 month   
  β SE p-value β SE p-value β SE p-value 
Size 1 -0.008 0.010 0.426 -0.013 0.017 0.441 -0.065 0.044 0.145 
Size 2 -0.003 0.010 0.798 -0.053 0.044 0.229 -0.003 0.017 0.858 
Size 3 -0.000 0.011 0.973 -0.006 0.018 0.739 -0.049 0.046 0.284 
Size 4 -0.003 0.011 0.776 -0.013 0.019 0.504 -0.072 0.050 0.150 
Size 5 -0.001 0.014 0.943 -0.020 0.024 0.401 -0.078 0.061 0.206 
Solvency 1 -0.000 0.012 0.982 -0.018 0.021 0.384 -0.097 0.053 0.072* 
Solvency 2 0.001 0.010 0.918 -0.008 0.017 0.630 -0.054 0.044 0.217 
Solvency 3 -0.004 0.010 0.687 -0.012 0.017 0.499 -0.069 0.045 0.127 
Solvency 4 -0.004 0.011 0.700 -0.015 0.019 0.427 -0.068 0.050 0.174 
Solvency 5 -0.006 0.011 0.575 -0.001 0.019 0.941 -0.025 0.049 0.615 
Profitability 1 -0.002 0.013 0.852 -0.022 0.022 0.315 -0.118 0.057 0.040** 
Profitability 2 -0.001 0.012 0.934 -0.016 0.019 0.420 -0.074 0.050 0.139 
Profitability 3 -0.003 0.010 0.742 -0.004 0.017 0.802 -0.048 0.044 0.272 
Profitability 4 0.001 0.010 0.956 -0.007 0.017 0.659 -0.043 0.044 0.329 
Profitability 5 -0.009 0.011 0.398 -0.006 0.018 0.753 -0.029 0.048 0.547 
The full data sample contains 173 observations from 4th March 1999 to 5th August 2010. Coefficients are for the regression 
             , where rt is portfolios return on day t and St is surprise component. Regression does not take het-
eroskedasticity into account. ***, **, * denotes the statistical significance of the coefficient at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively.  
 
 
In table 13 preceding surprise component measures are replaced by Euribor swap rates. 
The coefficients are stronger and standard errors smaller. Monetary policy decisions 
seem to cause surprises on stock markets and highly significant impact on every portfo-
lio. As in table 12, the coefficients are systematically negative. In addition, tough diver-
gence of significances of swap rate results compared to the Euribor and the Eonia ones 
raises doubt about joint determination of swap rates and stock returns. Swap rates are 
yet used as relevant surprise proxy (see note in section 6.1) and measurement bias are 
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not reported in prior literature. Despite of that issue, results indicate that either the basic 
model or the full data sample distorts results seriously.   
 
 
Table 13. The effect of surprises on stock returns (full data) (b). 
 
Euribor swap 1 week Euribor swap 1 month 
 
β SE p-value β SE p-value 
Size 1 -0.051 0.025 0.047** -0.150 0.063 0.021** 
Size 2 -0.057 0.023 0.015** -0.161 0.058 0.007*** 
Size 3 -0.060 0.022 0.010*** -0.154 0.058 0.009*** 
Size 4 -0.067 0.024 0.006*** -0.167 0.061 0.008*** 
Size 5 -0.059 0.025 0.019** -0.157 0.063 0.016** 
Solvency 1 -0.076 0.027 0.007*** -0.186 0.071 0.011** 
Solvency 2 -0.054 0.021 0.014** -0.144 0.054 0.010** 
Solvency 3 -0.052 0.022 0.024** -0.142 0.057 0.016** 
Solvency 4 -0.068 0.025 0.009*** -0.188 0.064 0.005*** 
Solvency 5 -0.044 0.023 0.058* -0.129 0.058 0.030** 
Profitability 1 -0.089 0.028 0.002*** -0.226 0.071 0.002*** 
Profitability 2 -0.058 0.025 0.022** -0.147 0.064 0.024** 
Profitability 3 -0.051 0.022 0.021** -0.148 0.055 0.009*** 
Profitability 4 -0.049 0.022 0.031** -0.132 0.057 0.024** 
Profitability 5 -0.046 0.023 0.047** -0.137 0.058 0.022** 
The full data sample contains 63 observations from 7th July 2005 to 5th August 2010. Coefficients are for the re-
gression              , where rt is portfolio return on day t and St is surprise component. Regression does 
not take heteroskedasticity into account. ***, **, * denotes the statistical significance of the coefficient at 1%, 
5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Improving the model and data sample transfigures results someway. The results in fol-
lowing tables (14 and 15) present results of refined data and White heteroskedasticity-
consistent estimates. Non-swap rates do not bring forth any significant results. Howev-
er, the coefficients from far portfolio to the other seem to shift on a sliding scale, being 
more visible as rate maturity increases.  
 
Right-hand panel (1 month swap rate) in table 15 discloses some statistically significant 
signs of asymmetric reactions in the portfolios. The least profitable and the most indebt-
ed firms’ stocks seem to react more among factor portfolios. Notable is that the absolute 
value of a coefficient increases when portfolio comes less profitable (range from -0.224 
to -0.085) or more indebted (range from -0.253 to -0.123).  
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Again, size-factor does not suggest any logical regularity and thus the size-factor hy-
pothesis is rejected. This diverges from prevalent view that small firms react more to 
monetary policy as Thorbecke (1997), Perez-Quiros and Timmermann (2000) and Ehr-
mann and Fraztscher (2004) conclude. One possible explanation is that size is less im-
portant factor in credit channel in the euro area as compared to the U.S. from where data 
of prior studies are collected. That means that commercial banks would not price the 
risk of a borrower firm grounded on firm size but on other factors. 
 
 
Table 14. The effect of surprises on stock returns (refined data). 
  Eonia     Euribor 1 week   Euribor 1 month   
  β SE p-value β SE p-value β SE p-value 
Size 1 -0.001 0.007 0.858 0.004 0.026 0.873 0.025 0.056 0.651 
Size 2 0.004 0.009 0.661 0.005 0.025 0.841 0.021 0.069 0.765 
Size 3 0.004 0.008 0.609 0.000 0.023 0.984 0.013 0.062 0.832 
Size 4 0.005 0.009 0.618 -0.003 0.027 0.900 0.014 0.088 0.875 
Size 5 0.006 0.014 0.660 -0.021 0.038 0.587 -0.056 0.136 0.679 
Solvency 1 -0.002 0.009 0.843 -0.018 0.027 0.513 -0.045 0.085 0.598 
Solvency 2 0.011 0.010 0.246 0.000 0.024 0.987 0.012 0.078 0.876 
Solvency 3 -0.001 0.009 0.904 -0.006 0.026 0.822 0.003 0.080 0.969 
Solvency 4 0.004 0.009 0.640 -0.001 0.027 0.966 0.022 0.070 0.751 
Solvency 5 0.005 0.012 0.641 0.012 0.030 0.682 0.029 0.086 0.736 
Profitability 1 0.005 0.011 0.666 -0.009 0.031 0.779 -0.028 0.100 0.780 
Profitability 2 0.003 0.009 0.718 -0.017 0.028 0.552 -0.038 0.093 0.682 
Profitability 3 0.000 0.009 0.989 0.005 0.027 0.839 0.023 0.075 0.762 
Profitability 4 0.005 0.009 0.531 -0.003 0.022 0.898 0.018 0.066 0.780 
Profitability 5 0.003 0.011 0.754 0.009 0.026 0.727 0.045 0.069 0.517 
The refined data sample contains 133 observations from 4th march 1999 to 5th August 2010. Coefficients are for the regres-
sion              , where rt is portfolio return on day t and St is surprise component. Regression is applied with 
White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and covariance. ***, **, * denotes the statistical significance of 
the coefficient at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
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Table 15. The effect of surprises on stock returns (refined data) (b). 
  Euribor swap 1 week   Euribor swap 1 month   
  β SE p-value β SE p-value 
Size 1 0.001 0.040 0.989 -0.169 0.092 0.072* 
Size 2 -0.008 0.034 0.808 -0.133 0.089 0.142 
Size 3 -0.012 0.034 0.723 -0.135 0.091 0.143 
Size 4 -0.026 0.032 0.417 -0.181 0.087 0.042** 
Size 5 -0.032 0.036 0.374 -0.189 0.089 0.039** 
Solvency 1 -0.046 0.037 0.224 -0.253 0.108 0.023** 
Solvency 2 -0.013 0.028 0.650 -0.136 0.073 0.067* 
Solvency 3 -0.010 0.034 0.776 -0.152 0.091 0.098* 
Solvency 4 -0.011 0.037 0.774 -0.142 0.088 0.112 
Solvency 5 0.002 0.041 0.958 -0.123 0.086 0.157 
Profitability 1 -0.030 0.038 0.437 -0.224 0.103 0.034** 
Profitability 2 -0.027 0.035 0.432 -0.187 0.096 0.058* 
Profitability 3 -0.006 0.034 0.860 -0.147 0.080 0.071* 
Profitability 4 -0.017 0.031 0.588 -0.163 0.082 0.052* 
Profitability 5 0.003 0.038 0.939 -0.085 0.082 0.303 
The refined data sample contains 55 observations from 7th July 2005 to 5th August 2010. Coefficients are for 
the regression              , where rt is portfolio return on day t and St is surprise component. Re-
gression is applied with White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and covariance. ***, **, * 
denotes the statistical significance of the coefficient at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Table 16 and 17 show the results of applied multiple regression model which takes port-
folios’ sensitivity to broad market movements into account. Only statistically significant 
coefficients at 5 % level are reached using Eonia rate. The coefficients of the market 
index are anyhow irrelevant and the attention is paid to surprise coefficients. There is 
some evidence for the importance of size-factor. Firstly, contrary to other factors, the 
coefficients go down as the firm size increase. Noticing merely this fact, implication is 
that small firms gain relatively more from monetary policy. This shows evidence 
against the results of prior studies. This order does not either can be explained rational-
ly. However, only rational (or positive) and statistically significant coefficients appear 
in middle-size portfolios in table 17 and the majority of size-portfolios are immune to 
surprises.  
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Table 16. The effect of surprises on stock returns with market beta (refined data). 
    Eonia     Euribor 1 week   Euribor 1 month   
  
 
β SE p-value β SE p-value β SE p-value 
Size 1 M 0.466 0.061 (0.000) 0.465 0.061 (0.000) 0.470 0.061 (0.000) 
  S -0.006 0.006 0.346 0.008 0.018 0.677 0.031 0.044 0.488 
Size 2 M 0.564 0.046 (0.000) 0.564 0.046 (0.000) 0.565 0.046 (0.000) 
  S -0.001 0.004 0.717 0.009 0.010 0.372 0.026 0.022 0.234 
Size 3 M 0.651 0.045 (0.000) 0.651 0.045 (0.000) 0.654 0.045 (0.000) 
  S -0.002 0.004 0.691 0.005 0.009 0.546 0.020 0.025 0.429 
Size 4 M 0.748 0.034 (0.000) 0.748 0.035 (0.000) 0.750 0.035 (0.000) 
  S -0.002 0.004 0.620 0.002 0.006 0.698 0.021 0.017 0.235 
Size 5 M 1.031 0.034 (0.000) 1.029 0.033 (0.000) 1.030 0.033 (0.000) 
  S -0.004 0.004 0.327 -0.013 0.007 0.072* -0.048 0.030 0.116 
Solvency 1 M 0.774 0.051 (0.000) 0.771 0.052 (0.000) 0.773 0.052 (0.000) 
  S -0.009 0.004 0.047** -0.012 0.007 0.096 -0.038 0.022 0.087* 
Solvency 2 M 0.631 0.039 (0.000) 0.632 0.039 (0.000) 0.633 0.039 (0.000) 
  S 0.005 0.006 0.373 0.004 0.007 0.544 0.018 0.020 0.367 
Solvency 3 M 0.666 0.036 (0.000) 0.664 0.037 (0.000) 0.669 0.037 (0.000) 
  S -0.007 0.004 0.049** -0.001 0.008 0.896 0.010 0.022 0.649 
Solvency 4 M 0.669 0.042 (0.000) 0.669 0.042 (0.000) 0.669 0.041 (0.000) 
  S -0.002 0.004 0.656 0.004 0.011 0.736 0.028 0.028 0.324 
Solvency 5 M 0.722 0.040 (0.000) 0.723 0.039 (0.000) 0.727 0.039 (0.000) 
  S -0.001 0.007 0.846 0.018 0.012 0.160 0.037 0.026 0.161 
Profitability 1 M 0.825 0.043 (0.000) 0.824 0.043 (0.000) 0.826 0.043 (0.000) 
  S -0.003 0.005 0.545 -0.003 0.008 0.732 -0.021 0.023 0.366 
Profitability 2 M 0.782 0.045 (0.000) 0.780 0.045 (0.000) 0.781 0.045 (0.000) 
  S -0.004 0.005 0.400 -0.011 0.006 0.092* -0.032 0.018 0.087* 
Profitability 3 M 0.637 0.041 (0.000) 0.636 0.041 (0.000) 0.639 0.041 (0.000) 
  S -0.006 0.004 0.170 0.010 0.010 0.317 0.029 0.025 0.244 
Profitability 4 M 0.602 0.041 (0.000) 0.602 0.041 (0.000) 0.602 0.041 (0.000) 
  S 0.000 0.005 0.985 0.002 0.008 0.842 0.023 0.024 0.337 
Profitability 5 M 0.625 0.043 (0.000) 0.626 0.042 (0.000) 0.633 0.041 (0.000) 
  S -0.002 0.007 0.739 0.014 0.013 0.297 0.052 0.034 0.127 
The refined data sample contains 133 observations from 4th March 1999 to 5th August 2010. Coefficients are for the regression 
                  , where rt is portfolios return and Mt is market index return on day t and St is surprise component. 
Regression is applied with White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and covariance. ***, **, * denotes the 
statistical significance of the coefficient at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Statistical significances of index-
coefficient are in parenthesis.  
 
 
The coefficients of the Eonia rate are quite small and the deviations between portfolios 
are slight as well. Anyway, monetary policy decisions seem to impact indebted and av-
erage-debted firms’ stocks. 1 month Euribor and 1 week Euribor swap measures support 
this. Also, the portfolio which includes firms of the highest equity ratio does not seem to 
react at all. This is quite opposite to Ehrmann and Fraztscher’s (2004) finding that firms 
out of debt react the most. Some measures indicate that average-profitable firms react to 
surprises. Profitability does not appear to be a significant factor. Anyway, ascending 
coefficients of profitability and solvency are in view also in both tables 16 and 17.  
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Table 17. The effect of surprises on stock returns with 
market beta (refined data) (b). 
    Euribor swap 1 week Euribor swap 1 month 
  
 
β SE p-value β SE p-value 
Size 1 M 0.932 0.078 (0.000) 0.921 0.080 (0.000) 
  S 0.025 0.018 0.167 -0.001 0.055 0.991 
Size 2 M 0.908 0.052 (0.000) 0.910 0.054 (0.000) 
  S 0.016 0.011 0.144 0.034 0.038 0.377 
Size 3 M 0.959 0.036 (0.000) 0.964 0.037 (0.000) 
  S 0.014 0.007 0.072* 0.041 0.022 0.063* 
Size 4 M 0.935 0.025 (0.000) 0.933 0.026 (0.000) 
  S -0.001 0.005 0.812 -0.010 0.020 0.607 
Size 5 M 0.978 0.021 (0.000) 0.978 0.021 (0.000) 
  S -0.006 0.005 0.230 -0.010 0.017 0.550 
Solvency 1 M 1.073 0.077 (0.000) 1.065 0.080 (0.000) 
  S -0.017 0.011 0.145 -0.058 0.035 0.102 
Solvency 2 M 0.846 0.034 (0.000) 0.847 0.035 (0.000) 
  S 0.010 0.006 0.126 0.018 0.020 0.358 
Solvency 3 M 0.934 0.043 (0.000) 0.932 0.045 (0.000) 
  S 0.015 0.009 0.093* 0.018 0.031 0.566 
Solvency 4 M 0.946 0.056 (0.000) 0.948 0.057 (0.000) 
  S 0.014 0.011 0.199 0.031 0.038 0.415 
Solvency 5 M 0.908 0.066 (0.000) 0.908 0.070 (0.000) 
  S 0.026 0.016 0.115 0.043 0.038 0.269 
Profitability 1 M 1.052 0.039 (0.000) 1.043 0.038 (0.000) 
  S -0.002 0.006 0.768 -0.033 0.021 0.111 
Profitability 2 M 1.068 0.055 (0.000) 1.070 0.056 (0.000) 
  S 0.001 0.008 0.894 0.009 0.025 0.728 
Profitability 3 M 0.876 0.046 (0.000) 0.871 0.049 (0.000) 
  S 0.017 0.010 0.087* 0.012 0.034 0.721 
Profitability 4 M 0.858 0.049 (0.000) 0.853 0.049 (0.000) 
  S 0.006 0.010 0.535 -0.007 0.031 0.819 
Profitability 5 M 0.851 0.067 (0.000) 0.859 0.072 (0.000) 
  S 0.026 0.016 0.121 0.072 0.044 0.106 
The refined data sample contains 55 observations from 7th July 2005 to 5th August 2010. 
Coefficients are for the regression                   , where rt is portfolios re-
turn and Mt is market index return on day t and St is surprise component. Regression 
is applied with White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and covari-
ance. ***, **, * denotes the statistical significance of the surprise-coefficient at 1%, 
5% and 10% levels, respectively.  Statistical significances of index-coefficient are in 
parenthesis.  
 
 
Looking the results of various models and diverse measures all at once, the evidence 
which would support the hypotheses is inconclusive. This is likely due to several rea-
sons: 
 
1) The surprise component measures are inaccurate 
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2) Stock portfolios involves covert financial factors which dislocate results or omit-
ted variable biases exist 
 
3) One day return is not suitable to measure stock price reaction  
 
4) The ECB’s monetary policy is well predicted 
 
The scatter plots in figure 9 (refined data is used) show that it is hard to find any defined 
relationship between index returns and monetary policy surprises and indicate that Eu-
ropean stock markets are quite immune to measured surprises. Similar patterns were 
noticed by picturing individual portfolios. The main problem is therefore not involved 
in portfolio construction.  
 
Problems which arise when surprise component is selected should not be ignored too 
flightily. Perez-Quiros and Sicilia (2002) as well as Bohl et al. (2008) point out the 
problems of the Eonia rate. Moreover, rates with longer maturities may be exposed to 
the many other forceful releases of macroeconomic announcements within a day. One 
way to improve the reliability of surprise measurement is high-frequency intraday anal-
ysis of price adjustment. However, the variability of the results depending on the choice 
of surprise measure indicates the necessary further clarification.  
 
The last reason is the most likely explanation. Perez-Quiros and Sicilia (2002) find that 
the financial markets have predicted the Governing Council’s monetary policy decisions 
rather well. Further, the ECB is seen to be more transparency than the FED even from 
the beginning of its existence (Blinder et al. 2008). Since the ECB’s transparency is 
increased already during the last decade, the surprise shocks in stock market are natural-
ly slight. Still, the inexplicable issue is why the most of the calculated returns are nega-
tively correlated with surprises.  
 
Bredin et al. (2009) find that monetary policy effects of the ECB are not detectable in 
the euro area. The data consist of the Bundesbank key interest rate changes during 
1989–1998 and the ECB rate changes during 1999–2004. In contrast to this study, a 
surprise for the ECB policy actions are is measured by using the three month Euribor-
futures. 
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Figure 9. The EURO STOXX index regressed on surprise measures. 
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Given that the coefficients shift on a sliding scale from far portfolio to the other, the 
comparison is implemented by using these portfolios. The final part of this section is to 
make seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) using multiple regression model (equation 
9) which generate smaller standard errors. The Wald test statistics are used to check for 
equality of parameters and reported in table 18. The SUR parameters are reported in 
appendix 3 and 4.  
 
  Table 18. Test of asymmetric reactions of portfolios. 
 Joint hypothesis H0= βi=βj Eonia 
Euribor 
1 week 
Euribor 
1 month 
Euribor 
swap 1 
week 
Euribor 
swap 1 
month 
Size 1 = Size 5 0.858 0.161 0.041** 0.446 0.752 
Solvency 1 = Solvency 5 0.561 0.026** 0.051* 0.016** 0.079* 
Profitability 1 = Profitability 5 0.804 0.231 0.068* 0.060* 0.045** 
         Size 1 = Solvency 1 0.676 0.139 0.054* 0.113 0.493 
         Size 5 = Solvency 5 0.687 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.062* 0.329 
              Size 1 = Profitability 1 0.662 0.425 0.158 0.179 0.587 
              Size 5 = Profitability 5 0.707 0.034** 0.003*** 0.113 0.180 
      Solvency 1 = Profitability 1 0.124 0.174 0.263 0.284 0.590 
         Solvency 5 = Profitability 5 0.976 0.578 0.252 0.798 0.333 
The refined data sample contains 133 observations from 4th March 1999 to 5th August 2010 for Euribor rates and Eonia rate and 
55 observations from 7th July 2005 to 5th August 2010 for swap rates. Joint hypothesis H0= βi=βj tests for equality of parameters 
i and j for surprise component, based on equation                    , where rt is portfolios return and Mt is market 
index return on day t and St is surprise component. ***, **, * denotes the statistical significance of the inequality at 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels, respectively.   
 
 
The results support a view that firm characteristics have resonance. The direction of 
asymmetry is parallel with presumptions in the cases of profitability and solvency so 
that more prosperous and less indebted firms have more positive (or less negative in 
some cases) coefficients. This means that when non-favorable monetary policy surprise 
takes place, those firms’ stock prices do not decrease as much as inverse firms’ and fa-
vorable surprises generate relatively more positive returns. 
 
Instead, the coefficients of size portfolios vary depending on the choice of surprise 
measure. Only statistically significant size-asymmetry is found using surprises derived 
from 1 month Euribor. In this case, coefficients show quite parallel, positive impacts in 
other size portfolios (not statistically significant) except in the largest firms’ portfolio 
which has negative coefficient (highly statistically significant). This causes that there 
seems to be difference also between the largest stocks’ returns compared to the most 
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profitable stocks and the least indebted stocks. In other cases, there are not plausible 
crosswise discrepancies. 
 
 
7.2. Portfolio returns after positive and negative monetary policy surprises 
 
The empirical testing focuses now to the last hypothesis which proposes that the stocks 
respond asymmetrically to positive and negative monetary policy surprises. The data is 
now set out to two parts and the direction of surprises is segregated. Simultaneously, 
observations whose surprise is null are extracted from the samples.  
 
Albeit this study is not focused on surprises itself, the remarkable insight is that the fi-
nancial markets tend to have regularly pessimistic view towards the ECB’s policy an-
nouncements. That is, surprises measured by the Eonia rate are twice as often positive 
than negative. Correspondingly, positive surprises occur 70 % more using 1 week Euri-
bor rate and 40 % more using 1 month Euribor rate.  
 
Firstly, table 19 and table 20 are discussed. Negative surprises seem to impact on many 
portfolios mainly when the Eonia rate is used while positive surprises seem to impact 
more likely when longer rates are used. Anyway, the significances reported are not ro-
bust for different surprise measures but many portfolios are little conditional on mone-
tary policy surprises regardless of the way of a surprise. Again, the negative coefficients 
of explanatory variables in some cases implicate results against rationality. No matter 
what the direction of surprise is, coefficients should be anyway positive, thus more neg-
ative surprise generate more negative stock returns and vice versa.  
 
Only rational and statistically significant reactions are observed in profitability 3-
portfolio for negative surprises and in solvency 2- and profitability 5-portfolios for posi-
tive surprises. The comparison between tables 19 and 20 exposes that negative surprises 
have overall stronger coefficients for surprise component and more often they have pos-
itive sign. The order is parallel with the results of intra-day dissection (Chuliá et al. 
2010) but against to the prospect theory and Lobo (2000, 2002) and Farka (2009) find-
ings that positive surprises have more sense to stock markets.  
 
 
 
 
76 
 
Table 19. The impact of negative surprises on stock returns. 
   Eonia     Euribor 1 week   Euribor 1 month   
  
 
β SE p-value β SE p-value β SE p-value 
Size 1 M 0.516 0.094 (0.000) 0.707 0.126 (0.000) 0.597 0.101 (0.000) 
  S -0.071 0.033 0.039** 0.022 0.031 0.471 0.238 0.189 0.215 
Size 2 M 0.597 0.068 (0.000) 0.704 0.084 (0.000) 0.651 0.080 (0.000) 
  S -0.069 0.023 0.005*** 0.024 0.018 0.187 0.069 0.112 0.544 
Size 3 M 0.727 0.077 (0.000) 0.755 0.070 (0.000) 0.721 0.074 (0.000) 
  S -0.053 0.027 0.058* 0.019 0.013 0.141 0.064 0.088 0.471 
Size 4 M 0.754 0.079 (0.000) 0.731 0.076 (0.000) 0.774 0.073 (0.000) 
  S -0.031 0.033 0.361 0.006 0.011 0.544 0.002 0.066 0.977 
Size 5 M 0.978 0.062 (0.000) 0.966 0.062 (0.000) 0.955 0.060 (0.000) 
  S 0.001 0.023 0.958 -0.007 0.006 0.209 0.002 0.051 0.965 
Solvency 1 M 0.699 0.115 (0.000) 0.766 0.119 (0.000) 0.777 0.107 (0.000) 
  S -0.043 0.040 0.297 -0.003 0.016 0.854 -0.200 0.119 0.099* 
Solvency 2 M 0.664 0.095 (0.000) 0.734 0.096 (0.000) 0.684 0.079 (0.000) 
  S -0.019 0.032 0.564 0.007 0.009 0.451 0.061 0.085 0.473 
Solvency 3 M 0.688 0.072 (0.000) 0.771 0.094 (0.000) 0.723 0.077 (0.000) 
  S -0.052 0.024 0.040** 0.015 0.014 0.290 0.148 0.109 0.180 
Solvency 4 M 0.753 0.074 (0.000) 0.745 0.087 (0.000) 0.719 0.070 (0.000) 
  S -0.069 0.027 0.015** 0.019 0.022 0.409 0.195 0.120 0.112 
Solvency 5 M 0.789 0.055 (0.000) 0.864 0.074 (0.000) 0.798 0.066 (0.000) 
  S -0.033 0.026 0.214 0.029 0.024 0.225 0.188 0.135 0.169 
Profitability 1 M 0.806 0.085 (0.000) 0.845 0.090 (0.000) 0.840 0.082 (0.000) 
  S -0.073 0.031 0.027** 0.012 0.014 0.406 -0.063 0.096 0.514 
Profitability 2 M 0.802 0.110 (0.000) 0.844 0.119 (0.000) 0.816 0.100 (0.000) 
  S -0.056 0.035 0.117 -0.002 0.011 0.871 -0.017 0.088 0.850 
Profitability 3 M 0.652 0.085 (0.000) 0.708 0.092 (0.000) 0.673 0.082 (0.000) 
  S -0.038 0.028 0.189 0.030 0.016 0.063* 0.155 0.103 0.137 
Profitability 4 M 0.717 0.062 (0.000) 0.750 0.063 (0.000) 0.680 0.058 (0.000) 
  S -0.013 0.025 0.601 0.006 0.012 0.599 0.142 0.120 0.242 
Profitability 5 M 0.641 0.065 (0.000) 0.762 0.085 (0.000) 0.716 0.068 (0.000) 
  S -0.033 0.028 0.246 0.018 0.025 0.477 0.172 0.131 0.197 
The data sample from 4th March 1999 to 5th August 2010 contains following observations: 35 for Eonia, 46 for Euribor 1 week, 48 
for Euribor 1 month. Coefficients are for the regression                   , where rt is portfolios return and Mt is market 
index return on day t and St is surprise component. Regression is applied with White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard 
errors and covariance. ***, **, * denotes the statistical significance of the surprise-coefficient at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively.  Statistical significances of index-coefficient are in parenthesis.  
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Table 20. The impact of positive surprises on stock returns. 
    Eonia     Euribor 1 week   Euribor 1 month   
  
 
β SE p-value β SE p-value β SE p-value 
Size 1 M 0.474 0.076 (0.000) 0.294 0.047 (0.000) 0.300 0.055 (0.000) 
  S -0.007 0.018 0.717 -0.012 0.012 0.314 0.004 0.025 0.872 
Size 2 M 0.609 0.068 (0.000) 0.454 0.042 (0.000) 0.451 0.045 (0.000) 
  S -0.001 0.011 0.945 0.005 0.010 0.598 0.015 0.023 0.514 
Size 3 M 0.676 0.065 (0.000) 0.568 0.046 (0.000) 0.564 0.050 (0.000) 
  S 0.006 0.012 0.597 0.002 0.009 0.793 0.014 0.017 0.423 
Size 4 M 0.801 0.041 (0.000) 0.733 0.037 (0.000) 0.687 0.038 (0.000) 
  S 0.005 0.011 0.659 0.005 0.009 0.601 0.031 0.023 0.176 
Size 5 M 1.034 0.049 (0.000) 1.082 0.036 (0.000) 1.069 0.042 (0.000) 
  S 0.003 0.008 0.649 -0.021 0.013 0.124 -0.056 0.037 0.137 
Solvency 1 M 0.854 0.077 (0.000) 0.716 0.038 (0.000) 0.709 0.034 (0.000) 
  S -0.001 0.011 0.912 -0.018 0.008 0.025** -0.047 0.017 0.007*** 
Solvency 2 M 0.647 0.049 (0.000) 0.561 0.040 (0.000) 0.582 0.041 (0.000) 
  S 0.022 0.012 0.076* -0.001 0.013 0.932 0.013 0.021 0.539 
Solvency 3 M 0.691 0.049 (0.000) 0.596 0.033 (0.000) 0.588 0.033 (0.000) 
  S -0.001 0.010 0.899 -0.010 0.011 0.369 0.005 0.020 0.808 
Solvency 4 M 0.681 0.049 (0.000) 0.613 0.041 (0.000) 0.570 0.047 (0.000) 
  S -0.002 0.011 0.841 -0.003 0.010 0.763 0.017 0.018 0.358 
Solvency 5 M 0.712 0.040 (0.000) 0.645 0.040 (0.000) 0.624 0.044 (0.000) 
  S -0.009 0.016 0.585 0.014 0.008 0.092 0.026 0.021 0.229 
Profitability 1 M 0.822 0.063 (0.000) 0.781 0.049 (0.000) 0.794 0.056 (0.000) 
  S 0.007 0.011 0.508 -0.007 0.012 0.552 -0.024 0.026 0.360 
Profitability 2 M 0.826 0.059 (0.000) 0.705 0.032 (0.000) 0.697 0.032 (0.000) 
  S 0.013 0.011 0.262 -0.018 0.010 0.084* -0.047 0.023 0.043** 
Profitability 3 M 0.656 0.048 (0.000) 0.578 0.039 (0.000) 0.540 0.041 (0.000) 
  S 0.002 0.010 0.809 0.001 0.015 0.970 0.026 0.028 0.348 
Profitability 4 M 0.615 0.060 (0.000) 0.515 0.044 (0.000) 0.517 0.049 (0.000) 
  S 0.001 0.013 0.924 0.002 0.008 0.804 0.006 0.014 0.643 
Profitability 5 M 0.664 0.050 (0.000) 0.550 0.049 (0.000) 0.518 0.055 (0.000) 
  S -0.019 0.015 0.230 0.006 0.010 0.542 0.051 0.030 0.088* 
The data sample from 4th March 1999 to 5th August 2010 contains following observations: 68 for Eonia, 78 for Euribor 1 week, 68 
for Euribor 1 month. Coefficients are for the regression                   , where rt is portfolios return and Mt is market 
index return on day t and St is surprise component. Regression is applied with White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard 
errors and covariance. ***, **, * denotes the statistical significance of the surprise-coefficient at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively.  Statistical significances of index-coefficient are in parenthesis 
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The final dissection is channeled into nonlinearity checking and reported in tables 21 
and 22. The parameters β₁ and β₂ denotes linear dependence and second-order nonlinear 
dependence of surprise, respectively. Market betas are not reported. Weak signs of non-
linearity are observed in five portfolios for negative surprises. Two of them does not 
have significant β1 coefficient. Positive surprises generate weak significance for nonlin-
earity only in two portfolios. Thus suggestive support is found that stock prices behave 
nonlinearly. 
 
For negative surprises, the β2 coefficients have negative signs which indicate that the 
effect of additional marginal surprise decreases as the magnitude of surprise increases. 
This is consistent with the prospect theory framework. Negative nonlinearity can be 
interpreted as following: the level of illogicality of negative β1 coefficient decreases as 
surprise component increases. However, the coefficients are uncommon large (above all 
-21.795 in profitability 5 portfolio). 
 
The same holds for positive surprises. The β1 coefficients have illogical sign in all sta-
tistically significant cases except in profitability 5 portfolio in table 22. Both statistically 
significant β2 coefficients are positive and indicate that as surprise component increases 
the stock markets illogical response increases too. This is just opposite direction than 
the prospect theory framework assumes.   
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Table 21. Nonlinearity checking for negative surprises. 
    Eonia     Euribor 1 week   Euribor 1 month   
  
 
β SE p-value β SE p-value β SE p-value 
Size 1 β₁ -0.173 0.102 0.102 -0.119 0.086 0.173 -0.222 0.440 0.616 
  β₂ -1.060 0.860 0.227 -1.003 0.632 0.120 -16.671 20.083 0.411 
Size 2 β₁ -0.137 0.082 0.106 -0.032 0.070 0.654 -0.166 0.322 0.608 
  β₂ -0.704 0.730 0.342 -0.395 0.481 0.416 -8.510 12.775 0.509 
Size 3 β₁ -0.105 0.086 0.231 -0.048 0.047 0.306 -0.268 0.283 0.349 
  β₂ -0.543 0.792 0.498 -0.478 0.332 0.157 -12.012 9.931 0.233 
Size 4 β₁ -0.135 0.063 0.041** -0.039 0.040 0.336 -0.298 0.280 0.293 
  β₂ -1.087 0.527 0.048** -0.320 0.293 0.281 -10.864 9.286 0.248 
Size 5 β₁ 0.036 0.038 0.339 -0.015 0.034 0.674 -0.182 0.232 0.437 
  β₂ 0.367 0.243 0.142 -0.052 0.239 0.828 -6.684 7.068 0.350 
Solvency 1 β₁ -0.133 0.108 0.225 -0.057 0.070 0.420 -0.264 0.380 0.492 
  β₂ -0.939 0.887 0.298 -0.386 0.431 0.376 -2.322 13.342 0.863 
Solvency 2 β₁ -0.067 0.073 0.364 -0.075 0.049 0.135 -0.369 0.275 0.187 
  β₂ -0.505 0.587 0.397 -0.580 0.332 0.088* -15.589 9.453 0.106 
Solvency 3 β₁ -0.075 0.063 0.244 -0.042 0.055 0.441 -0.244 0.297 0.416 
  β₂ -0.234 0.503 0.645 -0.405 0.383 0.296 -14.198 11.468 0.222 
Solvency 4 β₁ -0.151 0.079 0.066* -0.019 0.068 0.786 -0.146 0.277 0.601 
  β₂ -0.858 0.704 0.232 -0.265 0.527 0.618 -12.356 11.332 0.282 
Solvency 5 β₁ -0.087 0.069 0.220 -0.066 0.067 0.328 -0.081 0.311 0.795 
  β₂ -0.557 0.713 0.440 -0.674 0.470 0.159 -9.776 14.169 0.494 
Profitability 1 β₁ -0.103 0.081 0.215 -0.033 0.053 0.536 -0.303 0.339 0.376 
  β₂ -0.305 0.758 0.690 -0.315 0.376 0.407 -8.689 12.328 0.485 
Profitability 2 β₁ -0.090 0.100 0.372 -0.048 0.057 0.407 -0.289 0.329 0.385 
  β₂ -0.357 0.822 0.667 -0.325 0.377 0.395 -9.858 10.675 0.361 
Profitability 3 β₁ -0.086 0.081 0.300 -0.067 0.050 0.183 -0.217 0.327 0.510 
  β₂ -0.497 0.680 0.470 -0.691 0.387 0.082* -13.489 12.334 0.280 
Profitability 4 β₁ -0.090 0.062 0.158 -0.038 0.048 0.431 0.145 0.231 0.532 
  β₂ -0.799 0.701 0.263 -0.316 0.285 0.273 0.107 10.408 0.992 
Profitability 5 β₁ -0.151 0.068 0.034** -0.079 0.083 0.351 -0.430 0.304 0.165 
  β₂ -1.226 0.560 0.036** -0.685 0.607 0.266 -21.795 12.760 0.095* 
The data sample from 4th March 1999 to 5th August 2010 contains following observations: 35 for Eonia, 46 for Euribor 1 week, 48 
for Euribor 1 month. Coefficients are for the regression                      
   , where rt is portfolios return and Mt is 
market index return on day t and St is surprise component. Regression is applied with White heteroskedasticity-consistent 
standard errors and covariance. ***, **, * denotes the statistical significance of the surprise-coefficient at 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively.  Index-coefficients are not reported.  
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Table 22. Nonlinearity checking for positive surprises. 
    Eonia     Euribor 1 week   Euribor 1 month   
  
 
β SE p-value β SE p-value β SE p-value 
Size 1 β₁ -0.022 0.069 0.746 -0.043 0.056 0.448 -0.017 0.101 0.869 
  β₂ 0.100 0.415 0.810 0.188 0.283 0.510 0.250 0.997 0.803 
Size 2 β₁ 0.034 0.052 0.516 -0.024 0.040 0.539 0.018 0.069 0.791 
  β₂ -0.218 0.281 0.440 0.181 0.210 0.392 -0.038 0.759 0.961 
Size 3 β₁ 0.007 0.047 0.889 -0.006 0.042 0.895 0.042 0.062 0.503 
  β₂ -0.002 0.294 0.995 0.048 0.219 0.827 -0.334 0.637 0.601 
Size 4 β₁ -0.045 0.037 0.229 0.028 0.035 0.424 0.116 0.075 0.128 
  β₂ 0.317 0.231 0.175 -0.144 0.185 0.439 -1.016 0.776 0.195 
Size 5 β₁ -0.031 0.028 0.269 -0.058 0.028 0.046** -0.104 0.059 0.081* 
  β₂ 0.217 0.161 0.181 0.228 0.150 0.133 0.576 0.842 0.496 
Solvency 1 β₁ 0.033 0.051 0.522 0.022 0.031 0.481 0.010 0.068 0.878 
  β₂ -0.215 0.285 0.454 -0.248 0.168 0.145 -0.690 0.704 0.331 
Solvency 2 β₁ -0.032 0.040 0.429 -0.030 0.046 0.517 0.007 0.079 0.929 
  β₂ 0.343 0.241 0.160 0.175 0.236 0.460 0.071 0.819 0.931 
Solvency 3 β₁ -0.013 0.039 0.731 -0.074 0.032 0.026** -0.035 0.054 0.526 
  β₂ 0.077 0.204 0.707 0.390 0.171 0.025** 0.474 0.588 0.423 
Solvency 4 β₁ -0.030 0.048 0.529 -0.012 0.036 0.740 0.007 0.071 0.920 
  β₂ 0.178 0.287 0.537 0.053 0.175 0.761 0.117 0.703 0.869 
Solvency 5 β₁ -0.013 0.047 0.775 -0.011 0.042 0.791 0.054 0.071 0.449 
  β₂ 0.030 0.331 0.929 0.156 0.225 0.491 -0.340 0.715 0.636 
Profitability 1 β₁ -0.026 0.045 0.564 -0.002 0.042 0.954 -0.006 0.087 0.943 
  β₂ 0.212 0.259 0.415 -0.031 0.224 0.892 -0.217 0.939 0.818 
Profitability 2 β₁ 0.024 0.042 0.569 -0.023 0.038 0.556 -0.048 0.065 0.466 
  β₂ -0.072 0.259 0.782 0.029 0.197 0.882 0.008 0.738 0.991 
Profitability 3 β₁ -0.042 0.041 0.312 -0.050 0.036 0.163 -0.072 0.065 0.268 
  β₂ 0.279 0.221 0.212 0.310 0.203 0.132 1.182 0.664 0.080* 
Profitability 4 β₁ -0.048 0.047 0.318 0.002 0.043 0.963 0.008 0.064 0.903 
  β₂ 0.309 0.279 0.272 0.000 0.217 0.998 -0.017 0.631 0.978 
Profitability 5 β₁ 0.029 0.047 0.544 -0.020 0.041 0.634 0.159 0.083 0.060* 
  β₂ -0.300 0.310 0.337 0.157 0.238 0.512 -1.288 0.802 0.113 
The data sample from 4th March 1999 to 5th August 2010 contains following observations: 68 for Eonia, 78 for Euribor 1 week, 68 
for Euribor 1 month. Coefficients are for the regression                      
    , where rt is portfolios return and Mt is 
market index return on day t and St is surprise component. Regression is applied with White heteroskedasticity-consistent 
standard errors and covariance. ***, **, * denotes the statistical significance of the surprise-coefficient at 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively.  Statistical significances of index-coefficient are in parenthesis 
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8. CONCLUSIONS 
 
This thesis is focused on stocks’ asymmetric reactions to the ECB’s monthly decisions 
about the level of key interest rate in European stock markets. The main purpose is to 
find out whether there exist unequal price responses among classified portfolios based 
on firm characteristics. Second purpose is to investigate what role plays nonlinearity 
and positive and negative surprise components separately.  
 
Assuming that stock prices react only to unanticipated information, the surprise compo-
nent of the Governing Council’s decisions is required to define. For that purpose, five 
different short-term market rate measures are applied. The stock market reactions are 
measured by using stocks of the EURO STOXX index. The stock characteristics under 
consideration are firm size, financial standing and profitability. Portfolio returns are 
then calculated on policy announcement days and regressed on surprise component 
measure.  
 
The empirical results of this thesis show weak evidence that a reaction to monetary pol-
icy surprise depends on the size of a firm underlying the stock. Results are not robust 
for different models or surprise measures to generalize hypothetical price behavior. 
Weak signs are found that small firms gain relatively more from surprises than large 
firms. Further, small and midsize stocks seem to react significantly to negative surprises 
(when Eonia rates are used). In contrast to the previous studies, Gertler and Gilchrist 
(1994), Thorbecke (1997), Perez-Quiros and Timmermann (2000), Thorbecke and Cop-
pock (2001) and Guo (2004) agree that as the firm size becomes smaller the more the 
stock price suffer on tightening monetary policy. However, the results suggest that the 
firm size is not important factor in this context in the euro area.  
 
There is evident difference that reaction intensity depends on equity ratio. Indebted 
firms seem to suffer more from surprises in every case and those firms react convincing-
ly even after controlling different models and surprise measures. Firms with the highest 
equity ratio do not react statistically significantly to surprises. The results show much 
more negative coefficients for more indebted firms compared to self-financing firms. 
The Wald test rejects the hypothesis of equal parameters of portfolios with different 
debt-level. This is opposite to Ehrmann and Fratzscher’s (2004) finding that highly in-
debted firms react similar to the average firm but firms out of debt react the most. Also, 
the evidence challenges the study of Lamont et al. (2001) in which the reactions of fi-
nancial constrained firms to monetary policy do not differ from unconstrained ones. In 
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addition, using 1 month Euribor measure, the most indebted portfolio is susceptible to 
both positive and negative surprises but more to negative ones. Average-debted firms 
react only to negative surprises using Eonia rate. 
 
The estimated coefficients of profitability-portfolios behave similarly with solvency-
portfolios. Thus the evidence confirms also the hypothesis about the importance of prof-
itability of a firm. More often average-profitable portfolios are statistically significant 
than the far portfolios. Still, the Wald test rejects the equal susceptibility of the far port-
folios credibly. There is inconclusive evidence about the importance of the sign of sur-
prise. The least profitable and average profitable firms seem to react little to negative 
surprises using Eonia and 1 week Euribor rates. Instead, the second least profitable and 
the most profitable portfolio reacts to positive ones using 1 week and 1 month Euribor 
rates.  
 
The financial markets tend to have more often pessimistic consensus towards the ECB’s 
monetary policy decisions. Positive surprises occur quantifiable much more than nega-
tive ones. The results indicate that negative surprises have more sense which is quite 
opposite to former understanding.  
 
Only weak signs of nonlinearity are observed in three portfolios for negative surprises. 
Positive surprises generate weak significance for nonlinearity only in one portfolio. 
Thus suggestive support is found that stock prices behave nonlinearly but maybe in a 
trivial sense. However, only negative surprises generate logical nonlinearity in accord-
ance with the prospect theory framework. 
 
The empirical results are disconnected for the large part. The estimated coefficients and 
statistical significances are mobile to the regression model and selected explanatory 
variable. In some studies, some kind of rules of thumb is offered how much stock mar-
ket moves if given degree of surprise occur. Bernanke and Kuttner (2005), Basistha and 
Kurov (2008) and Farka (2009) all conclude that theoretical 100 basis points target rate 
surprise leads to 4–6 percent movement  in the aggregate U.S stock market. The quanti-
tative interpretations are not possible to do similarly with the euro area data because 
regression models coefficients and standard errors are both in general unrealistic.  
 
The results may arise from several reasons. Some problems are noticed to find indicator 
which measure validly and reliably monetary policy surprises. Also, high-frequency 
data would allow excluding other released market news during announcement days.  
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The conclusion is still that the Governing Council’s monetary policy decisions are fore-
casted quite faithfully in stock markets. Since the ECB’s transparency is increased al-
ready during the last decade, the surprise shocks in stock market are naturally slight. 
Still, the sense of credit channel is noticeable in the euro area. The evidence implies that 
in fact, against the preconception, small firms are in relatively better situation (as com-
pared to large firms) when surprises about the interest rate level take place. In addition, 
profitability of a firm may be as important characteristic as financial standing.  
 
These findings arouse some new interests. Firstly, it would be valuable to dissect how 
dissimilar are the lending practices in banking sector of the U.S. and the euro area and 
examine whether this fact have an influence to the dissimilar empirical results imple-
mented by similar ways. Secondly, if this kind of pecking order appear in the stock 
markets and it reflects real economic effects originated from asymmetric information, 
government officials should try to weaken the effects which are not firms’ own fault.   
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1. Formulas of financial ratios.   
 
 
           
                                 
                           
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
                                   
            
 
 
 
 
             
            
            
                         
 
 
 
 
 
Tobin (1969) estimated that company’s market value 
should be averagely the same than the replacement 
value of company’s capital. 
 
This equation gives the ratio which can be derived 
into three categories:  
 
Underpriced stock:        
Precisely priced stock:      
Overpriced stock:      
 
In the case of underpriced stock the replacement 
value of company’s capital is higher than company’s 
market value. Then the investments do not yield as 
much as ought from investors’ point of view. In the 
case of overpriced stock, company is worth to redou-
ble investments because their market value will be-
come higher than their book value.  
 
 
Return on assets (ROA) measures how much a firm 
has been able to generate profits by force of both 
equity and leverage. 
 
 
 
Equity ratio measures how large proportion of total 
assets in balance sheet is shareholders’ equity.  
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Appendix 2. Measured surprise components 1999-2010 (swap rates 2005-2010). 
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Appendix 3. SUR estimates (refined data). 
    Eonia     Euribor 1 week   Euribor 1 month   
  
 
β SE p-value β SE p-value β SE p-value 
Size 1 S -0.003 0.009 0.764 0.009 0.013 0.510 0.035 0.035 0.309 
  M 0.459 0.042 (0.000) 0.459 0.042 (0.000) 0.460 0.042 (0.000) 
Size 2 S -0.001 0.007 0.921 0.009 0.010 0.341 0.027 0.027 0.316 
  M 0.562 0.032 (0.000) 0.562 0.032 (0.000) 0.562 0.032 (0.000) 
Size 3 S 0.001 0.006 0.859 0.006 0.010 0.509 0.025 0.025 0.325 
  M 0.645 0.031 (0.000) 0.645 0.031 (0.000) 0.645 0.031 (0.000) 
Size 4 S -0.001 0.005 0.912 0.003 0.008 0.720 0.023 0.020 0.252 
  M 0.744 0.025 (0.000) 0.744 0.025 (0.000) 0.745 0.025 (0.000) 
Size 5 S -0.004 0.004 0.293 -0.013 0.006 0.032** -0.049 0.016 0.003*** 
  M 1.033 0.020 (0.000) 1.031 0.020 (0.000) 1.030 0.020 (0.000) 
Solvency 1 S -0.006 0.007 0.366 -0.011 0.010 0.288 -0.033 0.028 0.240 
  M 0.768 0.034 (0.000) 0.766 0.034 (0.000) 0.766 0.034 (0.000) 
Solvency 2 S 0.007 0.006 0.239 0.005 0.008 0.563 0.021 0.022 0.354 
  M 0.628 0.027 (0.000) 0.629 0.027 (0.000) 0.629 0.027 (0.000) 
Solvency 3 S -0.005 0.006 0.351 0.000 0.009 0.956 0.012 0.023 0.594 
  M 0.661 0.028 (0.000) 0.661 0.028 (0.000) 0.661 0.028 (0.000) 
Solvency 4 S 0.000 0.006 0.965 0.004 0.009 0.642 0.031 0.025 0.212 
  M 0.665 0.030 (0.000) 0.665 0.030 (0.000) 0.666 0.030 (0.000) 
Solvency 5 S -0.001 0.006 0.839 0.018 0.009 0.059* 0.034 0.025 0.168 
  M 0.722 0.030 (0.000) 0.723 0.030 (0.000) 0.722 0.030 (0.000) 
Profitability 1 S 0.001 0.006 0.873 -0.001 0.009 0.886 -0.011 0.025 0.654 
  M 0.816 0.031 (0.000) 0.815 0.031 (0.000) 0.815 0.031 (0.000) 
Profitability 2 S -0.004 0.006 0.513 -0.011 0.009 0.218 -0.031 0.024 0.186 
  M 0.782 0.029 (0.000) 0.780 0.029 (0.000) 0.780 0.029 (0.000) 
Profitability 3 S -0.004 0.006 0.542 0.011 0.009 0.207 0.032 0.023 0.160 
  M 0.631 0.028 (0.000) 0.632 0.028 (0.000) 0.632 0.028 (0.000) 
Profitability 4 S -0.001 0.006 0.915 0.001 0.009 0.871 0.022 0.024 0.357 
  M 0.603 0.029 (0.000) 0.602 0.029 (0.000) 0.603 0.029 (0.000) 
Profitability 5 S -0.001 0.007 0.868 0.014 0.010 0.166 0.052 0.027 0.058* 
  M 0.622 0.034 (0.000) 0.623 0.033 (0.000) 0.624 0.033 (0.000) 
The refined data sample contains 133 observations from 4th March 1999 to 5th August 2010. Coefficients are for the seemingly 
unrelated regressions from the model                   , where rt is portfolios return and Mt is market index return on day t 
and St is surprise component. ***, **, * denotes the statistical significance of the surprise-coefficient at 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively.  Statistical significances of index-coefficient are in parenthesis.  
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          Appendix 4. SUR estimates (refined data) (b).  
    Euribor swap 1 week   Euribor swap 1 month   
  
 
β SE p-value β SE p-value 
Size 1 S 0.011 0.013 0.422 -0.020 0.051 0.699 
  M 0.904 0.064 (0.000) 0.904 0.065 (0.000) 
Size 2 S 0.013 0.009 0.140 0.033 0.033 0.320 
  M 0.902 0.042 (0.000) 0.909 0.042 (0.000) 
Size 3 S 0.005 0.007 0.465 0.021 0.027 0.425 
  M 0.943 0.034 (0.000) 0.947 0.034 (0.000) 
Size 4 S -0.003 0.005 0.621 -0.015 0.019 0.455 
  M 0.933 0.025 (0.000) 0.929 0.025 (0.000) 
Size 5 S -0.001 0.005 0.849 -0.001 0.017 0.934 
  M 0.987 0.022 (0.000) 0.986 0.022 (0.000) 
Solvency 1 S -0.018 0.011 0.119 -0.067 0.043 0.120 
  M 1.072 0.055 (0.000) 1.057 0.056 (0.000) 
Solvency 2 S 0.008 0.007 0.237 0.019 0.026 0.475 
  M 0.843 0.034 (0.000) 0.847 0.034 (0.000) 
Solvency 3 S 0.007 0.008 0.380 0.005 0.031 0.877 
  M 0.918 0.038 (0.000) 0.920 0.039 (0.000) 
Solvency 4 S 0.008 0.009 0.420 0.019 0.036 0.604 
  M 0.933 0.046 (0.000) 0.937 0.046 (0.000) 
Solvency 5 S 0.021 0.010 0.036** 0.042 0.038 0.269 
  M 0.898 0.048 (0.000) 0.908 0.049 (0.000) 
Profitability 1 S -0.009 0.008 0.269 -0.050 0.030 0.096* 
  M 1.039 0.039 (0.000) 1.029 0.039 (0.000) 
Profitability 2 S 0.001 0.008 0.941 0.006 0.030 0.851 
  M 1.067 0.038 (0.000) 1.067 0.038 (0.000) 
Profitability 3 S 0.008 0.008 0.289 0.000 0.031 0.996 
  M 0.859 0.038 (0.000) 0.860 0.039 (0.000) 
Profitability 4 S 0.007 0.009 0.443 0.001 0.035 0.967 
  M 0.859 0.044 (0.000) 0.861 0.045 (0.000) 
Profitability 5 S 0.019 0.011 0.085* 0.064 0.043 0.135 
  M 0.839 0.054 (0.000) 0.852 0.055 (0.000) 
The refined data sample contains 55 observations from 7th July 2005 to 5th August 2010. Coefficients are for the 
seemingly unrelated regressions from the model                   , where rt is portfolios return and Mt is 
market index return on day t and St is surprise component. ***, **, * denotes the statistical significance of the 
surprise-coefficient at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  Statistical significances of index-coefficient are 
in parenthesis.  
 
 
